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Banking, Antitrust, and Derivatives:
Untying the Antitying Restrictions
CHRISTIAN A. JOHNSONI
INTRODUCTION
Banks are increasingly requiring their borrowers to
hedge and manage business risks through newly-developed
and innovative financial techniques. Banks are concerned
that their borrowers are at risk with respect to fluctuations
in interest rates or prices for key commodities. In
particular, if a bank makes a loan with a variable interest
rate, the bank is concerned that the interest rate may
increase beyond the borrower's ability to make interest
payments. Such increases and fluctuations could spell ruin
for the borrower if not properly hedged and managed. To
ensure that the borrower hedges such risks, banks are
requiring their borrowers to use over-the-counter ("OTC")
derivatives.
In addition to making the loan, the bank often wants
the borrower to enter into the required OTC derivative with
the bank itself. There are significant benefits for both
t Copyright © 2001 by Christian A. Johnson. Associate Professor of Law,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. B.A.; MPrA, University of Utah; J.D.,
Columbia University School of Law, 1990; C.P.A. The author gratefully
acknowledges the thoughtful and thorough research assistance provided by
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parties if the bank not only makes the loan, but also is a
party to the OTC derivative. There has been some
uncertainty, however, as to whether a bank acting as both
the lender and as a party to the OTC derivative violates the
antitying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act
("BHCA"). Under the BHCA, a bank is generally prohibited
from requiring a borrower, as a condition to granting credit,
to purchase additional products or services. Commentators
have raised questions and concerns about whether a bank
acting as both a lender and a party to the OTC derivative
with the same borrower could run afoul of these antitying
rules.2
This analysis of the antitying provisions is especially
timely as banks begin to offer new and different products to
their customers.3 As banks become more aggressive in
marketing new products to customers, the temptation to tie
the provision of credit either expressly or implicitly to the
1. Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (1956)
(amended 1970).
2. L. Clifford Craig et al., Legal Theories in Lawsuits Against Derivatives
Dealers in the Over-the-Counter Markets, in DERIVATIVES 1996: AVODING THE
RISKAND MANAGING THE LITIGATION 129, 168-69 (P.L.I. Corp. L. Practice Course,
Handbook Series No. B-932, 1996) (stating that "the facts of a particular case
may indicate that such a cause of action is viable"); Alan J. Berkeley & Jean E.
Minarick, Disclosure and Developments in Financing Instruments and
Techniques, in ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 335, 364-65 (P.L.I. Corp.
L. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 703, 1990) ("Commentators have noted
that, although some banks have required their borrowers to purchase the caps
from the lenders themselves, this can be risky because such a requirement may
violate the antitying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act."); Marsha E.
Simms, Structuring and Closing of Commercial Loans, in BANKING AND
COMMERCIAL LENDNG LAW 163 (A.L.I.-A.B.A., 1997) ("A bank should be careful
in requiring a borrower to obtain interest rate protection from it as a condition
of making a loan, since some courts have found such conditions to violate the
antitying rules of the [BHCA]."); Barry Taylor-Brill, Negotiating and Opining
on ISDA Masters, in SWAPS & OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1999 79, 92 (P.L.I. Corp. L.
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1147, 1999) (stating that "any U.S.
bank(s) which impose the following types of restrictions and requirements
should consider their liability under [the antitying rules of the BHCA]").
3. See generally John R. Engen, E-Brokerage's Integration Challenge,
BANKING STRATEGIES, May & June 2000, at 28 (discussing banks and e-
brokerage); Matt Ackermann, Cross-Seller 1st Union Boosts 401(k) Assets, ANI.
BANKER, July 7, 2000, at 6 (discussing asset management); Lynn Striegel,
Training Essential for People Working in Multiple Channels, AMi. BANKER, June
23, 2000, at 16 (stating that "extensive menu of products such as insurance,
broker-dealers services, mortgages, mutual fumds, investment advice, and new
finance-related [services]").
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purchase of these new products will increase.4 As banks
move from traditional lending activities to activities such as
acting as securities brokers and insurance agents, among
others, it will be crucial to understand the reach of the
antitying provisions.
There is no case law under the BHCA that resolves or
even discusses the issue with respect to new products such
as OTC derivatives. Even more problematic is that the
enactment of the BHCA antitying provisions pre-date the
OTC derivatives market, making it difficult to determine
how Congress would have viewed the issue. This article will
argue, however, that expressly requiring a borrower to
enter into an OTC derivative with the bank itself as a
condition for receiving credit does not violate the antitying
restrictions of the BHCA.
Part I of this Article will discuss the nature of OTC
derivatives and provide examples as to how OTC
derivatives can enable a borrower to minimize various
business risks. Part II will examine how banks are
encouraging their borrowers to utilize various risk
management techniques, such as OTC derivatives, and will
discuss the impact of the BHCA on such efforts. Finally,
Part III will analyze the elements of a tying claim under the
BHCA, and argue that a requirement to enter into an OTC
derivative with a bank as a condition to obtaining credit
will not constitute a violation of the BHCA. Part III first
discusses how a loan combined with an OTC derivative
such as an interest rate swap is not really two tied
products, but is actually, in substance, a fixed rate loan.
Part III then argues that these tied products do not satisfy
the "anticompetitive in nature" requirement because
typically only the lending bank is willing to enter into the
OTC derivative with the borrower. Finally, Part III
concludes that the traditional banking practice exception to
the antitying rules would exempt such tying arrangements
from the antitying provisions.
I. OTW DERIVATIVES
A derivative is a unique transaction designed to hedge
business risks. Although some participants in the OTC
4. This process has accelerated as banks have merged and developed
nationwide presences.
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derivatives market have suffered large losses through the
use of derivatives, the OTC derivatives market continues to
develop and expand. OTC derivatives provide an
opportunity for borrowers to hedge and minimize their
business risks.
A. Nature of OTC Derivatives
The term derivative includes a wide variety of financial
transactions that are entered into in various financial
markets. The transactions can be based on any number of
underlying indices, such as an interest rate or currency or
commodity prices, and take on a variety of different forms
or structures. Derivatives range in complexity from "plain
vanilla" interest rate swaps 5 to more complex transactions
involving equities, commodities, and other more exotic
transactions.
A derivative is typically defined as "a financial contract
whose value depends on the values of one or more
underlying assets or indexes of asset values." In a
derivative, parties typically agree to exchange payments
based upon the change in the value or performance of an
index or asset.' The change in the underlying index or asset
is then typically multiplied by an agreed upon amount,
commonly referred to as the notional amount," to determine
the total that must be paid by one party to the other.
A derivative can be either a standardized or a
customized contract. Standardized contracts are typically
5. For a discussion of plain vanilla swaps, see infra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text.
6. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION & OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
DERIVATIVE PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS: JOINT STUDY
CONDUCTED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SENATOR RIEGLE ON
DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS 2 (1993) [hereinafter JOINT STUDY]; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 24 (1994) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; GROUP OF THIRTY
GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 28-
29 (1993) [hereinafter GROUP OF THIRTY].
7. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 10 (noting the definition of "swap" in
Appendix HI); GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 6, at 31; GAO REPORT, supra note 6,
at 28.
8. The parties do not actually ever exchange the notional amount, but
instead use it as an amount to base the calculations of their payment
obligations. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing notional amount).
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traded over an exchange such as the Board of Trade, and
cleared through a clearinghouse.9 The most common types
of exchange derivatives are futures and options. In a
futures transaction, the parties agree to the sale and
purchase of a designated commodity or financial instrument
at a set price in the future. An option is similar to a future,
with a party purchasing the right to buy or sell property at
an agreed-upon price prior to an expiration date.
A huge market has developed, however, in transactions
that are customized by large commercial banks, investment
banks, and similar financial institutions. ° This is commonly
referred to as the "over-the-counter" market in which
various kinds of customized derivative instruments are
developed for their customers." This article will focus
primarily on derivatives entered into in the OTC
derivatives market.
The OTC derivatives market has expanded and evolved
over the last two decades. 2 It is estimated that the notional
amount outstanding as of the end of 1997 in the OTC
derivatives market for interest rate swaps, currency swaps,
and interest rate options alone was more than $24 trillion."
Parallel with this growth, the type and number of
participants entering the market also have increased. 14 Not
only do large financial institutions participate in the OTC
derivatives market, but smaller and less sophisticated
participants that are involved in all types of businesses and
industries also participate."
9. See id. at 4 ("Exchange-traded contracts are standardized as to maturity,
contract size, and delivery terms.").
10. See id. ("OTC markets involve customized derivative products in which
the parties negotiate all details of the transactions or agree to certain
simplifying market conventions."). For a general discussion of the development
of the derivatives industry, see SATYAJIT DAs, SWAP-DERIVATIVE FINANCING--
THE GLOBAL REFERENCE TO PRODUCTS, PRICING, APPLICATIONS AND MARKETS 14-
30 (1993).
11. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
12. For a general description and discussion of the derivatives market, see
DAS, supra note 10.
13. ISDA Market Survey, Summary of OTC Derivative Market Data,
http'//www.isda.org/d6.html (April 3, 1998) [hereinafter Market Survey].
14. ISDA, Educational Information on Derivatives,
http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.htm (last visited 1/11/01) ("In addition to
being used by corporations, swaps and related derivatives are used by banks,
state and local governments, government-sponsored enterprises and
multilateral lending organizations.").
15. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 6, at 34-35 ("Roughly 87% of the
2001]
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OTC derivatives can be structured in a variety of ways,
and be based on a number of different indices. The two most
common types of OTC derivatives involve hedging interest
rate and currency exposure.16 As the OTC derivatives
market matures and becomes more sophisticated, however,
parties can use OTC derivatives to also hedge risks from
the movement in the price of commodities, equities, and
other types of assets."7
B. Benefits of OTC Derivatives
OTC derivatives can provide significant risk
management benefits when used prudently. Although some
parties have suffered significant losses due to their
misuse,' a party can improve its creditworthiness by using
OTC derivatives to hedge business risks. 9 The most
reporting private sector corporations use interest rate swaps, while 64% use
currency swaps and 78% use forward foreign exchange contracts.").
16. For a general discussion of interest rate and currency derivative
products, as well as other more uncommon derivatives, see ANTHONY C. GOOCH
& LINDA B. KLEIN, DOCUMENTATION FOR DERIVATIVES 159-320 (1993).
17. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (stating that assets include
"stacks, bonds, physical commodities, such as wheat, oil and lumber"); Eileen
Baecher, Swaps and the Derivatives Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES
& SYNTHETICS 114-16 (Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman eds., 1994) (discussing
broad categories of derivative market products).
18. Misuse of OTC derivatives can result in significant losses. Despite their
advantages, derivatives can be risky even for large, seemingly secure, publicly
traded corporations. There is a growing number of companies that have suffered
devastating losses as a result of their derivatives activities. For example,
Procter & Gamble Co. lost $157 million on derivatives tied to movements in the
yields "on five-year U.S. Treasury notes and the price of 30-year U.S. Treasury
Bonds." Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers Trust Faces Inquiry on Derivative Sales, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 1, 1994, at C1. Other companies such as Air Products & Chemicals,
Gibson Greetings Inc., and Mead have all lost tens of millions of dollars by
entering into derivatives that moved against them. See Timothy L. O'Brien,
Bankers Trust Pays $67 Million to Settle Derivatives Dispute with Chemical
Firm, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1996, at A5. Although Air Products lost $107 million
in 1994, it did receive a settlement payment of $67 million after it sued Bankers
Trust with respect to the transactions. See id.; see also James P. Miller, Air
Products Takes a Charge of $60 Million, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994, at A3;
Steven Lipin & Jeffrey Taylor, Bankers Trust Signs Accord on Derivatives,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1994, at A3. Although Gibson Greetings eventually only
paid $6.2 million of the $23 million that it owed to Bankers Trust through a
court settlement, the settlement is still indicative of the great potential for
losses. See id.
19. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25; GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 6, at
36-37; Anatoli Kuprianov, The Role of Interest Rate Swaps in Corporate
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common risks hedged and managed through OTC
derivatives typically include minimizing the risk from
changes in interest or currency rates. OTC derivatives can
also be used to hedge other business risks such as
fluctuations in the price of commodities.
In addition to the hedging benefits of OTC derivatives,
they can also serve a number of other functions. For
example, derivatives can be used to lower the effective cost
of a borrower's debt.2' Derivatives also can be used to
manage existing assets and liabilities.22 Although these
other benefits can be of importance to participants in the
OTC derivative market, this Article will focus primarily on
the benefits of OTC derivatives for a borrower by reducing
various business risks that it faces from volatile changes in
variable interest rates and commodity prices.
1. Hedging Variable Interest Rates. Although many
borrowers are able to borrow more readily at a variable
rate, most borrowers would prefer to pay a fixed rate of
interest.23 However, by borrowing at a variable rate, the
borrower is subject to the risk that the variable interest
rate on the loan may increase and exceed the borrower's
ability to pay. This risk can be minimized by entering into
an OTC derivative referred to as an interest rate swap,
swapping a variable rate payment for a fixed rate
Finance, FED. RES. BANK RIcHMoND ECON. Q., Summer 1994, at 53-58
(discussing hedging through interest rate swaps); Joseph L. Motes, A Primer on
the Trade and Regulation of Derivative Instruments, 49 SMU L. REV. 579, 585-
87 (1996).
20. For a summary of those benefits, see Leslie Rahi, What Makes a Good
OTC Counterparty?, in THE HANDBOOK OF DERIVATIVES AND SYNTHETICS 331
(Robert A. Klein & Jess Lederman eds., 1994).
21. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25; GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 6, at
34-35; see also Kuprianov, supra note 19, at 53-58 (discussing lowering finance
costs through derivatives).
22. See GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 6, at 36 ("a company may want to
change the characteristics of its existing debt portfolio" [through interest rate
swaps]); Rahl, supra note 20, at 331; Christopher D. Olander & Cynthia L.
Spell, Interest Rate Swaps: Status Under Federal Tax and Securites Law, 45
MD. L. REV. 21, 23 (1986).
23. See generally Carl R. Beidleman, The Role of Interest Rate Swaps in
Managing Cash Flows, in INTEREST RATE SWAPS 13-20 (Carl R. Beidleman ed.,
1991) ("characteristics of interest rate swap participants"); George
Handjinicolaou, The Place of Interest Rate Swaps in Financial Markets, in
INTEREST RATE SWAPS 41-42 (discussing floating-rate financing) (Carl R.
Beidleman ed., 1991).
2001]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
payment.24 In the early 1980s, this was virtually the only
type of OTC derivative available.25 The first real use of
interest rate swap agreements began in the late 1970s.25
Since then, activity in this area has exploded. Estimates
place the outstanding notional principal amount for interest
rate swaps at the end of the first six months of 1997 at $22
trillion.2 As a comparison, the notional amount outstanding
as of December 31, 1995 was $12.8 trillion.28
An interest rate swap typically involves swapping fixed
interest rate payments for variable interest rate payments,
or vice versa.29 Parties now, however, enter into various
hybrids of the early interest rate derivatives, such as
interest rate caps, floors, collars, or corridors."0 In an OTC
derivative swap, parties agree to exchange periodic
payments. These payments are calculated by multiplying
the notional amount of the transaction by a pre-agreed rate,
price, or index.
The following example illustrates the hedging benefits
that accrue to the borrower: In a plain vanilla interest rate
swap, a dealer ("DealCo") and a manufacturing company
("ManCo") agree to exchange payments based upon
predetermined interest rates. For example, assume that
ManCo has borrowed $10 million at a variable interest rate
equal to prime, but would prefer to pay a fixed rate in order
to limit the risk that interest rates will rise to a level that
will exceed its ability to pay. ManCo could enter into an
interest rate swap with DealCo to hedge that risk.
In an interest rate swap, parties agree to swap payment
24. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 5 (listing interest rate contracts).
25. See DAS, supra note 10, at 18-19.
26. See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and
Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 50 (1996); DAS, supra note 10, at 15
(discussing the history of swap development); A Brief History of Derivatives,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 6 ("It is not the idea that is new, it is the
volume."). See generally Nasser Saber, Interest Rate Swaps: Valuation, Trading
and Processing (1994) (discussing the development of interest rate market).
27. See Market Survey, supra note 13. For an overall discussion of the size
of the derivatives market, see DAS, supra note 10, at 4-11. Official statistics,
however, may actually underestimate the true size of the market. See Confused
by Rival Estimates of Market Size? Here's Why, SwAPs MONITOR, Oct. 11, 1993,
at 4 (discussing problems of gathering accurate data).
28. See Market Survey, supra note 13.
29. Id.
30. For an explanation of each of these transactions, see GOOCH & KLEIN,
supra note 16, at 211-24.
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obligations based upon a specified notional amount. The
notional amount is never exchanged between the parties,
but is used to calculate the payment amounts. For example,
because ManCo wants to hedge its variable interest rate
risk under the loan, the parties would probably use $10
million as the notional amount. In a plain vanilla interest
rate swap, ManCo would make a fixed rate payment to
DealCo and DealCo would make a variable rate payment to
ManCo.
Based on hypothetical current market conditions in this
example, ManCo agrees to make a payment to DealCo equal
to a fixed interest rate payment of ten percent (10%).
DealCo agrees to make a payment to ManCo equal to the
prime rate in effect on the payment date. Assume that the
parties entered into the swap agreement on January 1st
and agreed to exchange payments annually on the last day
of each year for five years.
On December 31st of Year One, assume that the prime
rate was fourteen percent (14%). DealCo would be obligated
to make a payment to ManCo equal to $1,400,000 (14%
multiplied by $10 million). ManCo would be obligated to
make a payment to DealCo in the amount of $1 million
(10% multiplied by $10 million). Typically, the terms of the
swap agreement require that the payments be made on the
same day and be netted against each other. In our example,
DealCo would make a $400,000 payment to ManCo. See
Diagram 1-1:
Diagram 1-1
Interest Rate Swap Diagram
(Fixed Rate = 10%, Prime Rate = 14%)
loan ($10 million)
20011
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(Only net payment of $400,000 paid to ManCo)
ManCo has met its hedging goal because it has avoided
paying more than a net amount of 10% on its variable rate
loan. ManCo would use the $400,000 that it received from
DealCo to meet its variable interest rate payment of 14%.
If the prime rate had gone down to 8% instead, ManCo
would still have had an effective interest rate cost of 10%
equal to the 8% that it would pay to its lender under the
loan and the $200,000 net payment that it paid to DealCo.
See Diagram 1-2:
Diagram 1-2
Interest Rate Swap Diagram
(Fixed Rate = 10%, Prime Rate = 8%)
loan ($10 million)
interest payment ($800,000)
ManCo
fixed payment ($1 million)
DealCo
variable payment ($800,000)
(Only net payment of $200,000 paid to DealCo)
Swaps, similar to the plain vanilla interest rate swap,
also can be used to hedge the risk of the movement of a
rate, index, or price in other areas such as commodities and
equities. For example, if a food processor wanted to hedge
the risk against increases in wheat prices, it could enter
into a swap in which it would agree to pay a fixed price for a
bushel of wheat in exchange for payments based on the
same bushel of wheat at the current spot price. Similarly,
an investor could hedge the risk of its stock holdings by
agreeing to pay a variable amount to a dealer based on
increases in a particular stock price in exchange for
payments based on changes in a stock index such as the
Vol. 49
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S&P 500 from the dealer.
2. Hedging Currency Rate Risks. Parties doing
business in different currencies are subject to risks caused
by fluctuations in currency rates.' 1 The problem generally
occurs when a party transacts business using a foreign
currency. For example, a U.S. corporation may import goods
from foreign countries, paying for the goods in the seller's
currency. If the foreign currency appreciates in value with
respect to the dollar, it becomes more expensive for the U.S.
corporation to purchase the goods.32 Similar problems can
occur when a party borrows in one currency yet conducts
business in another.33 Currency swaps, however, can
provide significant protection against such risks.34
OTC derivatives involving currency evolved around the
same time as interest rates swaps. The first currency
derivative product to receive widespread publicity involved
a currency swap between the World Bank and IBM entered
into in 1981."5 These transactions were intended to enable a
party to hedge against currency fluctuations and to lower
its financing costs.
36
The most common type of currency derivative is a
currency swap. As of June 30, 1997, there was an
outstanding notional amount of $1.5 trillion with respect to
currency swaps." The currency swap is very similar to an
interest rate swap, but typically will involve the actual
31. As of June 30, 1997, the outstanding notional amount of currency swaps
was $1.5 trillion. See Market Survey, supra note 13.
32. See RICHARD H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 632-33 (1995) (discussing an example of buying and
paying in pesos and yen).
33. Much of the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s occurred because
parties were unable to repay their U.S. loans because their own domestic
currencies had collapsed. See OTN Explores Asia's Economic Crisis, at
http:/www.megastories.com/seasia/why/why.htm (Aug. 23, 2000).
34. CARL A. BATLIN, LINKAGES BETWEEN INTEREST RATE SWAPS AND CROSS-
CURRENCY SWAPS, IN INTEREST RATE SWAPS 362 (Carl R. Beidleman et. al., ed.,
1991); FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 32, at 633-34 (1995).
35. NASSER SABER, INTEREST RATE SWAPS: VALUATION, TRADING AND
PROCESSING 18 (1994).
36. See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 16, at 201; Donald Strassheim,
UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL DERiVATIVES: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENTS
121-22 (1997) (discussing how fluctuations in currency complicate "efforts to
conduct international business").
37. See Market Survey, supra note 13.
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swapping of principal amounts." Other OTC derivatives
involving currency transactions include swaptions, forward
foreign exchange agreements, and currency options.
°
3. Hedging Commodity Price Fluctuations. For many
parties, the price of the commodity that they purchase,
market, or process can be their most significant business
expense." During the 1990s, commodity prices for oil and
precious metals, among others, fluctuated wildly. Properly
hedging these risks can ensure that a company can not only
survive, but also thrive. Some companies have "been a
major use of commodity hedqing techniques because [their]
survival has depended on it." 2
Just as with derivatives designed to minimize interest
rate risk, dealers also offer "swaps, options, swaptions and
integrated hedges" to minimize the risks of swings in
commodity prices.' The extreme volatility of prices in the
commodities area makes OTC derivatives a natural choice
to minimize the risks that such volatility can bring." OTC
38. See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 27, at 201; Strassheim, supra note 36, at
121-22; BATLIN, supra note 34, at 374 (discussing structure of currency swaps);
JOHN F. MARSHALL & KENNETH R. KAPNER, THE SWAPS MARKET 40-44 (1993).
39. See GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 16, at 226-27 (explaining swaptions); id.
at 235-36 (explaining forward rate agreements); id. at 248-51 (explaining
currency options).
40. See David Stropes & Steven Vollmer, Corporate Risk Management
Profiles, in COMMODITY DERIVATIVES AND FINANCE 123 (Kathleen Tener Smith &
Pam Kennison eds., 1996) (discussing examples of companies that rely on
commodities).
41. See Jennifer Barrett, Update: Oil Surges as Inventories Drop, at
http'//www.thestreet.com/brknews/energy/1051369.html (Aug. 23, 2000) ("The
October future contract for crude oil leapt... 5%... on the New York
Mercantile Exchange Wednesday."); Christopher L. Gilbert & Celso Brunetti,
Commodity Price Volatility in the Nineties, in COMIMODITY DERIVATIVES AND
FINANCE, supra note 40. For example, aluminum was up 72% during 1994 and
London coffee was up over 200% during the eighteen month period ending
December 1994. See id.
42. Stropes & Vollmer, supra note 40, at 123 (discussing hedging activities
of Forest Oil Corporation).
43. Brian A. Toal, Derivatives, OIL & GAS INVESTOR, Apr. 1995, at 26;
MARSHALL & KAPNER, supra note 38, at 44-46 (discussing an example of
commodity swap).
44. See Toal, supra note 43, at 26 ("Consider what one money center bank
says about market movements in the natural gas business: 'Annualized price
volatility can be greater than 50% in nearby months.'); Daniel Yu, Here Come
Commodity Swaps, ASIAMONEY, Mar. 1990, at 10; GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note
16, at 281 n.166 (discussing volatility).
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derivatives have been designed to hedge the risk of volatile
prices in everything from pulp and paper 4' to natural gas
and electricity.46
Parties can enter into commodity swaps just like
interest rate swaps." Assume, for example, that a natural
gas producer ("NatCo") is concerned about natural gas
prices." In the event that natural gas prices were to fall,
NatCo faces the risk that it may not be able to cover its
marginal production prices, affecting its ability to meet its
debt payments, among other expenses. Speculator Corp
("SpecCo"), on the other hand, believes that natural gas
prices are going to increase. NatCo could hedge its risk by
entering into a commodity swap with SpecCo.
Assume that natural gas prices are currently $3.80 per
million BTU ("MMBTU"). In a commodity swap, NatCo
would agree to pay the market price on the payment date of
natural gas multiplied by the required notional amount and
SpecCo would agree to make a fixed payment to NatCo of
$4.00 per MMBTU. If natural gas prices fell to $3.50 per
MMBTU, and assuming that the payments were to be
exchanged and netted on the same date, SpecCo would
make a payment equal to $0.50 multiplied by the notional
amount.
NatCo, through the commodity swap, has limited its
risk to price decreases below $4.00 per MMBTU. In this
case, NatCo would produce natural gas and sell it in the
open market for $3.50 per MMBTU. However, its effective
net sales price of natural gas would be $4.00 per MMBTU
($3.50 + $0.50 paid by SpecCo), enabling it to earn a profit
sufficient to pay its debt services and other expenses.
SpecCo, however, has suffered a loss on the commodity
45. See Commodities: Utilities, Energy Companies Expand Risk
Management, DERIVATIVES WEEK, Jan. 5, 1998, at 6 (discussing trades involving
"cash-settled pulp and paper collars").
46. See Toal, supra note 43, at 26 (discussing examples of commodity
transactions involving natural gas); Jonathan Ratzesberger, New Kid on the
Grid; Energy Company Readies Electricity Trading, Plans Massive Hiring,
DERIVATIVES WEEK, Jan. 5, 1998, at 1 (discussing electricity trading).
47. Many of the more common types of commodity swaps include plain
vanilla swaps, participation swaps, basis swaps, refining margin swaps, double
up swaps, and extendible swaps. See Anthony Lerner & Dinsa Mehta,
Controlling Energy Price Risk, in COMMODITY DERIVATIVES AND FINANCE, supra
note 40, at 31.
48. See other examples of commodity swaps in Lerner & Mehta, supra note
47 (discussing examples involving oil prices &jet fuel).
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swap because natural gas prices did not increase as
anticipated, but rather decreased.
II. TYING AND THE BANK HOLDING CoMPANY ACT
Banks have become increasingly active in the OTC
derivatives market, often entering into OTC derivatives
with their borrowers. Increasingly banks are requiring their
borrowers to enter into OTC derivatives to hedge not only
any interest rate risk, but also general business risks.
Banks also would prefer that any hedges be done with the
bank itself. Requiring the borrower to enter into an OTC
derivative with the bank as a condition of receiving credit,
however, may subject the bank to liability under the Bank
Holding Company Act.
A. Banks and the OTC Derivative Market
Some of the largest banks in the world are also dealers
in OTC derivatives. Because of their large OTC derivative
operations, banks trade not only with the general public,
but often with their own customers. When dealing with its
own borrowers, banks would prefer that the borrower be
obligated to enter into OTC derivatives with the bank itself.
1. Role as a Dealer. Unlike the option, futures, and
stock exchanges, large banks tend to dominate the OTC
derivatives market. These banks are not only those
headquartered in the United States such as Citibank,
Chase Manhattan Bank, and Bankers Trust Company,49 but
are also large foreign banks headquartered in Switzerland,
Japan, Britain, and other large financial centers around the
globe." In fact, more than 100 of ISDA's 185 primary
members are banks.5
49. See Rankings of U.S. Commercial Banks at December 31, 1994, SWAPS
MONITOR, Mar. 14, 1994, at 8. For a discussion of the derivative activity of the
major U.S. banks, see Gerald A. Edwards, & Gregory E. Eller, Derivatives
Disclosures by Major U.S. Banks, 1995, FED. RES. BULL. 791 (Sept. 1, 1996);
JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 11 (reviewing the chart in Exhibit 2 of the
exposure of U.S. commercial banks).
50. See summary of the primary members of ISDA (listing majority of
worlds largest commercial banks), at http://www.isda.org/membership/
index.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001)).
51. See id.
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The banks in these areas earn trading revenue by
attempting to take advantage of changes in market rates or
prices through derivatives.2 They have been particularly
aggressive in the interest rate swap area. For example,
Bank of America's "portfolio includes over 26,000 interest
rate swaps having a total notional amount exceeding $690
billion."5 One study estimates that the top ten U.S. bank
dealers in derivatives had trading revenue of more than
$35.9 billion for the ten-year period ending in 1993." For
example, one-third of Bank One's profits of $1 billion in
1993 related to their derivative trading activities.55 These
lenders also earn significant fees through their derivative
operations. 6 Even smaller banks have earned significant
profits from their involvement with OTC derivatives."
2. Acting as a Dealer with a Borrower. As the OTC
derivatives market has become more competitive, banks
have begun to enter into OTC derivatives with not only the
largest and most sophisticated financial institutions, but
52. See GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 25; GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 6, at
43; JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing "trading profits"); see also Steven
Lipin & Gabriella Stem, Bankers Trust Gets Big Boost from Sale of Derivatives,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1994, at A3 (stating that "almost three-fourths of [Bankers
Trust's] first quarter profit came from the sale of derivative products."). The
majority of the largest traders and dealers in the derivative market are
commercial banks. See Carol Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE,
Mar. 7, 1994, at 49 (listing by notional amounts the largest dealers in the OTC
market).
53. Bank of America's Response to Thrifty Oil Co.'s Claim Objection, at 7, In
re Thrifty Oil Co., 212 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997) (No. S.D. 92-09132-
All).
54. See Kenneth H. Bacon, Congress is Getting Serious About Rules for
Derivatives, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1993, at Cl.
55. Loomis, supra note 52, at 50.
56. Banks and investment firms also had $5 billion in revenue from their
swap dealings in 1994. T. C. Hagamam, Derivatives and the Banks, MGMT.
ACCT., June 1, 1995, at 16; Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks and Capital: An
Analysis of Swap Risks and a Critical Assessment of the Basle Accords
Treatment of Swaps, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 259, 275 (1995) (stating that
"[siwaps account for a growing share of revenues and profits for banks and
securities firms"); JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that firms "expect to
generate income from transaction fees, bid-offer spreads, and their own trading
positions").
57. See Christopher Rhoads, By the Numbers: Some Small Banks Church
Out Derivatives Profits, Am. BANKER, Feb. 9, 1996, at 6 ("Despite the scare over
derivatives, some community banks say they have turned out to be big money-
makers.").
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also with their smaller and less creditworthy borrowers.58
Although a large bank may have hundreds of parties with
whom it enters into OTC derivatives, it may have several
times that many borrowers to whom it lends money. Banks
already have begun to tap their borrowers as OTC
derivative counterparties.59
Banks are integrating provisions relating to the use of
OTC derivatives by their borrowers into their loan
documentation. A review of loan documentation by the
author of 200 different multi-lender agented loan
transactions indicates that banks are integrating provisions
into their loan documentation relating to their borrowers'
OTC derivative activities." Of the 200 different loan
transactions reviewed, more than 180 of these loan
agreements contained detailed provisions regarding the
borrower's derivative activities.6'
Although this review is admittedly nonrandom and
58. See Triple-A Vehicles Provoke Suspicion Among Users, EUROMONEY,
Mar. 1994, at 58 ("The shrinking universe of triple-A banks cannot satisfy
demand for the top credit rating among derivatives' users.").
59. "It is not uncommon, in these cases, for the lender itself to offer the
swap, or, in the case of a syndicated facility, for more than one of the lenders or
an affiliate of a lender, to be listed among the counterparties approved of in
advance to provide the required swaps." GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 16, at 374-
75; see also George Melloan, Global View: Leeson's Law: Too Much Leverage
Can Wreck a Bank, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, at A15 ("Most large banks have
set up trading floors to offer customers opportunities to hedge risks with
derivatives."). For an example of a customer relationship in which a commercial
bank has both lent money to its borrower and entered into derivatives, see In re
Thrifty Oil Company, 212 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997), affd L49 B.R. 537
(S.D.Cal. 2000). For a discussion of Thrifty Oil, see infra notes 99-119 and
accompanying text..
60. For a discussion of the documentation and bankruptcy issues associated
with a bank acting as a dealer with its customers, see generally CHRISTIAN A.
JOHNSON, OTC DERIVATIVE DOCUMENTATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
EXECUTIVES 77-78 (Bowne 2000); Christian A. Johnson, At the Intersection of
Bank Finance and Derivatives: Who Has the Right of Way?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1
(1998); Christian A. Johnson, Risky Business: OTC Derivatives Risk Can Be
Minimized Through Proper Loan Documentation, J. LENDING CREDIT RISK
MGMT., Sept. 1999, at 72; Christian A. Johnson, Risky Business: Acting as
Lender and OTC Derivative Dealer with the Same Customer, J. LENDING &
CREDIT RISK MGMT., Oct. 1999, at 66.
61. The author reviewed the loan documentation for 200 large multi-lender
agented loan transactions that were entered into between 1995 and 1999
[hereinafter referred to as "Review of Loan Documentation"]. Over thirty eight
different agents (and probably an equal number of law firms) were involved in
the 200 transactions. See JOHNSON, OTO DERIVATIVE DOCUMENTATION, supra
note 60, at 99.
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anecdotal, it is indicative of the aggressive efforts currently
being made by banks to confront the risks and
opportunities that OTC derivatives may present for their
borrowers and themselves. It is also important to note that
the review was done with respect to loans made by
syndicates of the largest and most sophisticated banks in
the world. These banks are typically on the leading edge of
financial risk management techniques, and their reference
to and usage of OTC derivatives is indicative of their
importance for hedging risks.
Entering into OTC derivatives with their borrowers is a
natural progression for banks. Banks have already
conducted much of the due diligence with respect to the
creditworthiness of the borrower, permitting the banks to
do OTC derivatives with their borrowers without having to
do additional due diligence.62 In addition, the lender's
familiarity with the financial affairs of the borrower also
results in a highly accurate understanding of the borrower's
potential needs for OTC derivatives. Finally, and probably
most importantly, the bank as a lender has already
developed a relationship of trust and understanding with
the borrower,' resulting in the bank being a natural choice
for the borrower with whom to do OTC derivatives.
Although the banks that are also dealers in the OTC
derivatives market are probably the most likely to act as
both a lender and a counterparty in the OTC derivative
with their borrower, smaller banks also participate. Even if
a smaller bank does not have a trading floor, they could
enter into OTC derivatives with their borrower by using a
correspondent dealer bank to provide any trading and back
office support they need. They could also enter into a "back-
to-back trade" with a dealer to hedge any risk they have
taken with their borrower. Finally, they could also make an
62. See DOUGLAS A. HAYES, BANK LENDING POLICIES 82 (1971) ("[W]ithout
exception, large banks maintain credit files on all business borrowers.") "As in
all credit-sensitive agreements, '[k]now your counterparty.' There is no
substitute for good, fundamental credit analysis and firsthand knowledge of the
counterparty and its principals." Rahl, supra note 20, at 336; see also Bruce A.
Baird, et al., Recent Developments in Litigation Involving Derivative Contracts,
90 A.L.I.-A.B.A 295, at 302-03 (May 10, 1996) (due diligence regarding the
borrower's financial situation is not just important for the lender but also for
the dealer acting as the borrower's counterparty).
63. See HAYES, supra note 62, at 81 ('The relationship between banks and
their commercial borrowers has the following characteristics: (1) There are
usually close and confidential relations between the bank and the borrower").
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investment in modeling and information software to be able
to price and monitor the OTC derivative themselves.'
3. Mandating the Use of OTC Derivatives. Banks are
requiring their borrowers to enter into OTC derivatives to
hedge business risks. Banks commonly use affirmative
covenants in their loan documentation with a borrower to
require a borrower to hedge interest rate risk.65 In the
author's review of two hundred (200) loan agreements that
contain provisions relating to the borrowers' OTC derivative
activities, sixty-two (62) of them had affirmative covenants
requiring borrowers to enter into OTC derivatives, typically
to hedge the borrower's variable interest rate risk." Several
loan agreements with oil producers also had provisions
requiring the borrower to hedge the risk that variable oil
prices may decrease. Many borrowers may deal extensively
with commodities such as grain or oil, which are
transactions that can be easily, and often are, hedged.67
Bank antitying provisions and antitrust law restrictions
against anticompetitive tying arrangements have been an
important part of antitrust law since its inception.68
64. Interview with Matt Bayless, Vice President of Bank One (Sept. 13,
2000).
65. An example of an affirmative covenant requiring a borrower to enter
into an interest rate swap was Bank of America's loan transaction with Great
Western Refining Company ("GWR"). It provided that the GWR shall: "[niot
later than six months following the Closing Date, enter into one or more
Approved Swap Agreements with respect to an aggregate principal amount not
less than $43,000,000 and deliver to Agent copies of such Approved Swap
Agreement." Reply Brief of Thrifty Oil Co. at 9, In re Thrifty Oil, 212 B.R. 147
(Bankr. S.D. Cal., 1997) (No. S.D. 92-09132-All); see also B. Taylor, Swap Risk,
4 REV. OF FIN. SERVICES REG. 17, at 24 (Feb. 3, 1988) ("Loan agreements not
only define the scope of permissible swaps; in many cases, they might also
contain a 'positive swap clause,' requiring the borrower to hedge the loan's
floating rate.").
66. See Review of Loan Documentation, supra note 61.
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for NatCo/SpecCo example.
68. For a general discussion of the restrictions against tying, see William M.
Hannay & William A. Montgomery Tying Arrangements: Practice Under
Federal Antitrust, Patent, and Banking Law, 39-2nd (Bureau of Nat'l Aff., Inc.
1997); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 216-46(student ed. 1985); HEBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 350-91 (2nd ed. 1999); SPENCER WEBER
WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 1 (Jeffrey L. Kessler
rev., West Group 1999); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRImES, THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANBOOK § 7 (2000).
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Antitying provisions are part of both the Sherman Act69 and
the Clayton Act," demonstrating Congressional concerns
over the anticompetitive effects of tying.7 Antitying claims
have also been permitted to be brought under Section Five
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.72 In response to
concerns that there were special considerations with respect
to tying arrangements and banking, Congress has enacted
special federal antitying provisions under the Bank Holding
Company Act.7"
The Bank Holding Company Act74 was enacted by
Congress in 1956 in response to concerns that the antitrust
provisions under the Clayton and Sherman Acts might be
insufficient to curb the anticompetitive behavior of banks
and their affiliates. The legislative history indicates that
Congress was concerned that, "because of the importance of
the banking system to the national economy, adequate
safeguards should be provided against undue concentration
of control of banking activities."
The BHCA generally governs the activities of "banks" "
and has been extended by the Federal Reserve Board to
69. Sherman Act, § 1 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1 (1994)).
70. Clayton Act, § 3 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994)).
71. See H.R. REP. No. 63-627, at 10-13; S. REP. No. 63-698, at 6-9 (1914).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1997).
73. For a history of the Bank Holding Company Act and the amendments,
see Carl A. Sax & Marcus H. Sloan III, Legislation Note: The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (1971). For a discussion of
the policy concerns, see Joseph C. Chapelle, Section 1972: Augmenting the
Available Remedies for Plaintiffs Injured by Anticompetitive Bank Conduct, 60
NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 706 (1985) (discussing policies underlying antitying
provisions); Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, Competition at the Teller's
Window?: Altered Antitrust Standards for Banks and Other Financial
Institutions, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 657 (1987); Daniel R. Fischel et al., The
Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 329-330
(1987); Austin & Solomon, A New Antitrust Problem: Vertical Integration in
Correspondent Baning, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 366, 390 (1973).
74. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994)).
75. S. REP. No. 1095, at 1 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482.
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c). The definition defines a "bank" as
any institution organized under the laws of the United States, any
State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any territory of
the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin
Islands which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a legal right
to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making
commercial loans.
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include bank holding companies and their nonbank
subsidiaries.77 The BHCA is enforced by the attorney
general, who may "institute proceedings in equity to
prevent and restrain" violations of the statute." Remedies
and damages under the BHCA include civil penalties, 9
private treble-damage actions," and suits for injunctive
relief by either the U.S. government or private parties.8'
The BHCA was amended in 1970 to include what are
commonly referred to as the "antitying" provisions now
found in 12 U.S.C. § 1972 ("Section 1972").82 The most
important provision provides that "a bank shall not in any
manner extend credit.., on the condition or
requirement.., that the customer shall obtain some
additional credit, property, or service from such bank other
than a loan, discount, deposit or trust service." 3 The statute
also encompasses products or services that might be offered
77. 12 C.F.R. § 225.7(a) (1994).
78. 12 U.S.C. § 1973.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(2)(F).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1975; Kabealo v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 17 F.3d 822 (6th
Cir.) (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 64 (1994); Lancianese v. United Bank of Mt.
Hope, 783 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1986).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1976.
82. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, §
106(b), 84 Stat. 1760, 1766-67 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)
(1994)). In addition to the antitying provisions, the amendments also prohibited
reciprocal and exclusive dealing arrangements. See id.
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(A). The entire provision reads as follows:
A Bank shall not in any manner extend credit, lease or sell property of
any kind, or furnish any service, or fix or vary the consideration for any
of the foregoing, on condition or requirement-
(A) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or
service from such bank other than a loan, discount, deposit or trust
service;
(B) that the customer shall obtain some additional credit, property, or
service from a bank holding company or such bank, or from any other
subsidiary of such bank holding company;
(C) the that customer provide some additional credit, property or
service to such bank, other than those related to and usually provided
in connection with a loan, discount, deposit, or trust service;
(D) that the customer provide some additional credit, property, or
service to a bank holding company of such bank, or to any other
subsidiary of such bank holding company; or
(E) that the customer shall not obtain some other credit, property, or
service from a competitor of such bank, a bank holding company of
such bank or any subsidiary of such bank holding company, other than
a condition or requirement that such bank shall reasonably impose in a
credit transaction to assure the soundness of the credit.
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by a subsidiary or affiliate of the bank.' Typically, the
borrower would be viewed as entering into an OTC
derivative with, or purchasing an OTC derivative from, the
bank.
Conceivably, it could be argued that a companion
subprovision might also apply. Under 12 U.S.C. §
1972(1)(C), there can also be a tying issue when the
borrower, as a condition for receiving credit from the bank,
is required to provide to the bank "some additional credit,
property or service."85 For example, by entering into the
OTC derivative with the bank, is the borrower the provider
or the recipient of the OTC derivative? The bank could
require the borrower to sell an OTC derivative such as a
cap to the bank, which might be viewed as selling a product.
To establish a violation of the antitying provisions of
the BHCA, a claimant generally must show that: (1) there
was a tying arrangement between two products or services;
(2) the practice was anticompetitive; (3) there was a benefit
to the bank; (4) there was damage to the claimant; and (5)
the tying arrangement was unusual and not subject to an
exception.86 Each of these elements must be demonstrated
in order to establish liability.
III. UNTYING THE ANTITYJNG RULES
The antitying rules should not be applicable to
situations in which a bank makes it a condition of
extending credit that the borrower enter into an OTC
derivative with the bank. A careful analysis of the required
elements that constitute a violation of the antitying
provisions demonstrates that the statute should be
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)(E) (from "a bank holding company of such bank, or
[from] any subsidiary of such bank holding company").
85. Id. at § 1972(1)(C). It is also applicable if the customer is required to
provide such credit property or service to the bank holding company of the bank
or a subsidiary of the bank holding company. Id. at § 1972(1)(D).
86. For a general discussion of the elements that a claimant must show, see
James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation: What Constitutes Violation of Provisions
of Bank Holding Act Prohibiting Tying Arrangements, 74 A.L.R. FED. 578
(1999); Daniel Aronowitz, Retracing the Antritrust Roots of Section 1972 of the
Bank Holding Company Act, 44 VND. L. REV. 865 (1991); Joseph C. Chapelle,
Section 1972: Augmenting the Available Remedies for Plaintiffs Injured by
Anticompetitive Bank Conduct, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 706 (1985); Robert
Finke & Daniel G. Hildebrand, Antitrust Compliance in the Banking Industry,
C880 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 179, 181 (1994).
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inapplicable to this banking practice.
A. Tying Arrangement
To constitute a violation of the BHCA, the borrower is
required to show that there was a tying arrangement.
Under this analysis, the borrower would need to show that,
in order to obtain credit from the bank, the borrower was
required to purchase another product or service from the
bank such as an OTC derivative.
1. Express Tie. The most straight-forward case for
demonstrating a tying arrangement would be for the loan
documentation to require that the OTC derivative be done
with the bank extending the credit. It appears to be rare,
however, for a bank to expressly require the borrower to
enter into the OTC derivative with the bank itself. In fact,
the author noted no express requirement that a required
OTC derivative be done only with a member of the bank
group in the 200 loan agreements that were reviewed." It is
unclear to the extent that banks acting as the sole lender to
a borrower require that an OTC derivative be done with the
bank itself.
Regardless of current market practice, however, banks
would strongly prefer that the OTC derivative be done with
the bank. Apart from any profit that a bank may earn on
the OTC derivative itself, there are important reasons why
the OTC derivative should be done with the bank. If a
borrower were to enter into an OTC derivative with a third
party, that would subject the borrower to the risk that the
third party would not perform under the transaction. This
is commonly referred to as "credit risk."88 In the event that
87. For a discussion of the author's review of various loan agreements, see
JOHNSON, OTC DERIVIATIVES DOCUMENTATION, supra note 60, at 99.
88. See JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 12; GAO REPORT, supra note 6, at 52
(explaining "the possibility of financial loss resulting from a counterparty's
failure to meet its financial obligations"); id. at 23 (discussing the aggregation
or interconnection of risk); GROuP OF THIRTY, supra note 6, at 47; Adam R.
Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance
into the Abyss, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 1023, 1047 (1994) ("The 'credit risk' in a
derivative transaction is the risk that the participant will default on contractual
obligations to a counterparty, resulting in loss."). In understanding credit risk,
however, it is important to distinguish credit risk from "systemic risk." "System
risk" is the risk that the failure of a major participant in the market could lead
to a domino effect on the entire market. See id. at 1047. Although a party may
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the third party were to default on the OTC derivative, the
borrower may actually end up being less creditworthy as a
result of the trades. By serving as both the counterparty
and the lender, no such additional risks are introduced into
the banking relationship.
The bank would also be able to best structure the OTC
derivative and monitor its results. Because of its knowledge
of the borrower and the credit to be extended, the bank
would be able to develop a transaction that would provide
the best opportunity to hedge the targeted business risks.
For example, the bank would best understand the amount
of notional amount that should be used, the tenor, and
other unusual characteristics that should be in the
transaction. The bank would also probably be more flexible
in restructuring the OTC derivative than an independent
dealer if the risks to be hedged were to change because of
its concerns with respect to the overall credit worthiness of
the borrower.
The importance of there being an "express" tie was
reinforced in two decisions89 involving what is commonly
referred to as "collateral protection insurance" or "force-
placed" insurance." These cases analyzed whether a
requirement that borrowers purchase comprehensive and
collision auto insurance when financing an auto purchase
through a bank violated the BHCA antitying provisions.
These auto loans provided that if the borrowers did not
purchase auto insurance, the bank was authorized to
purchase it for them, and add the premium cost to the
borrower's loan balance.
In both Kenty9' and McLain,92 the court failed to find a
tying relationship. The courts held that, because the
borrower was free to buy their own auto insurance from a
be unable to control systemic risk, it does have the ability to minimize its credit
risk through carefully selecting its counterparties or by requiring collateral.
89. See Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, 92 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1996); McLain
v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 105 F.3d 898 (4th Cir. 1997).
90. Michael P. Malakoff & David W. Snyder, An Update of Forced-Placed
Insurance Suits 227, 230 (P.L.I. Corp. Law & Practice, Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7188, 1997); James M. Cain & Leonard A. Bernstein,
Functional Regulation of Bank Sales of Insurance-A Complicated Matrix is
Developing with Potential Pitfalls, 52 Bus. LAw. 1057, 1070-71 (1998); Eugene
J. Kelley Jr. et al., Collateral Protection Insurance: Current Issues and Defenses,
54 CONSUMIER FIN. L. Q. REP. 14, 17 (2000).
91. Kenty, 92 F.3d at 384.
92. McLain, 105 F.3d at 898.
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company of their choosing, there was no tying
arrangement-in spite of the fact that the bank bought theinsurance itself after the borrower failed to do so. 3
Extending the courts' analysis to OTC derivatives, it could
be argued that so long as the bank did not require the OTC
derivative to be done with the bank, there could not be a
violation.
It is unclear, however, whether the collateral protection
insurance cases are necessarily applicable. First, banks in
the collateral protection insurance cases were not in the
business of providing the required auto insurance, and it
was unclear if the bank profited from purchasing the
insurance on behalf of the borrower. Second, the nature of
the products are very different. The auto insurance is a
standardized product provided by multiple insurance
companies. In contrast, the OTC derivative is a highly
specialized and stylized product.94
2. One Product Versus Two. Assuming that there is a
tie in form between the loan and the OTC derivative, there
may not be a tie in substance. Instead of two tied products,
there is probably only one integrated loan. At least in the
context of OTC interest rate derivatives,95 the tied products
should be characterized as a single one. When the borrower
simultaneously enters into a variable rate loan and an OTC
derivative, it can be shown that the bank has actually made
a fixed rate loan to the borrower. If the lender has actually
made what amounts in substance to a fixed rate loan, there
would appear to be no tying arrangement. In other words,
although the lender has "tied" the OTC derivative to the
loan, the interest rate swap was just one component or part
of a fixed rate loan.
It can demonstrated graphically that a bank
concurrently making a loan and entering into an interest
rate swap with the borrower may actually be making a
fixed rate loan:
93. Kenty, 92 F.3d at 395; McLain, 105 F.3d at 902.
94. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
95. This argument would be inapplicable to a situation in which the bank is
requiring a commodity or other type of OTC derivative to hedge business risks
as part of it extending credit.
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loan proceeds
repayment of loan proceeds
Borrower floating rate interest (loan) Bank
floating rate interest (swap)
fixed rate interest (swap)
With respect to the two transactions, typically the
outstanding principal amount of the loan will be a multiple
of, or the same amount as, the aggregate notional amount
under the OTC derivatives.96 Under this scenario, the
amount of the variable rate interest payment of the loan
would be calculated on the same notional amount as the
variable rate swap payment under the swaps.97 As can be
seen from the chart, after offsetting the floating rate
payments, the borrower in essence is left making a fixed
rate interest payment to the lender.
The argument becomes even stronger when coupled
with an understanding that the bank could actually have
offered a fixed rate loan to the borrower by using
derivatives as a component of the fixed rate loan to hedge
its risks. For example, the bank could offer a fixed rate loan
and then hedge its exposure either on a portfolio basis, or
by entering into an interest rate swap itself with another
party, swapping fixed rate payments for variable rate
payments with another counterparty. The antitying rules
96. See In re Thrifty Oil Co., 212 B.R. 147, 149 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997), affd
L49 B.R. 537 (S.D.Cal. 2000).
97. However, as a factual matter in the case, the two payments varied
slightly because the variable interest rate under the loan was based on Bank of
America's "reference rate," an amount typically equal to prime, and the floating
rate payment under the swap was based on the London interbank offering rate,
(LIBOR). LIBOR "refers to the interest banks have to pay other banks in order
to borrow money in the London money market." Id. at 149 n.2. The difference in
payments, however, did not appear to influence the court's decision in that this
difference is never commented upon by the court.
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should not be invoked merely because a bank chooses to
make a variable rate loan (coupled with an interest rate
swap) as opposed to a fixed rate loan.
Many banks prefer to enter into a variable rate loan
combined with an interest rate swap as opposed to a fixed
rate loan. First, at many banks the lending group and the
derivatives group operate independently, each with its own
credit policies and profit and loss concerns. The lending
group will make the loan, and the derivatives group will
enter into the OTC derivative with the borrower if it can
make money doing so. Second, the variable rate loan
coupled with an OTC derivative is much more flexible than
a fixed rate loan.
For example, if the OTC derivative were offered
separately, the parties could tailor the transaction to reflect
their requirements. The borrower and the banker may only
see a need to enter into an interest rate swap with a
notional amount equal to one-half of the outstanding loan
balance. Several different interest rate swaps could also be
entered into to reflect different pricing and risk
possibilities. The tenor of the interest rate swap could also
be shorter than the tenor of the loan.9"
Third, there may be legal concerns with collecting
damages for the termination of the swap upon the
bankruptcy of the borrower. If the interest rate swap were
considered to be a component of the fixed rate loan, it could
be argued that any damages from terminating the swap
may constitute "unmatured interest," and would therefore
be uncollectible under the U.S. bankruptcy code.99
3. Thrifty Oil. There is no authority under the BHCA
antitying rules pursuant to which a lender has argued that
it actually made a synthetic fixed rate loan as opposed to
entering into a separate and distinct loan transaction
followed by an interest rate swap. In a different legal
context, however, this argument was made in a bankruptcy
court decision entitled In re Thrifty Oil Co.,"' involving a
98. Interview with Matt Bayless, Vice President of Bank One (Sept. 13,
2000).
99. See Johnson, At the Intersection, supra note 60, at 67.
100. 212 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997), affd, L49 B.R. 537 (S.D.Cal.
2000) Thrifty Oil has not yet appealed the bankruptcy court's decision. For a
brief summary of the decision, see Court Considers Damages Under Interest
Rate Swap Agreement, BCD NEWS & COMMENT (Sept. 23, 1997); Court
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loan in which Bank of America acted as both a lender and
the dealer. Although the court did not discuss, or even
mention, the antitying restrictions, its decision did turn on
whether the lender had actually made a fixed rate loan for
purposes of the U.S. bankruptcy code.
The issue concerned whether the damages claimed by a
bank upon termination of an OTC derivative with a
bankrupt or insolvent borrower could be characterized as a
claim for "unmatured interest," a claim generally denied by
bankruptcy courts. The court in Thrifty Oil dealt with this
issue by holding that the damages claimed by Bank of
America, as the bank/counterparty in the case, under the
derivatives entered into with its borrower, were not
unmatured interest, and thus Bank of America was entitled
to recovery because the transactions were not characterized
as a fixed rate loan.
In Thrifty Oil, Golden West Refining Company ("GWR")
negotiated a $75 million loan with Bank of America("BofA").'' The term sheet outlining the transactions
indicated that both parties would enter into an interest
rate-syndicated swap as part of the loan. °2 BofA eventually
made a variable rate loan of $45 million to GWR."'
Concurrent with the loan, BofA entered into three plain
vanilla interest rate swaps 04 with GWR.'05 Thrifty Oil
Company ("Thrifty") guaranteed the interest rate swaps.0 6
It is important to note that, although Thrifty was not
required to enter into the interest rate swaps with BofA,
Considers Damages Under Interest Rate Swap Agreement, 10 CoMM. LENDING
LITIG. NEWS, No. 9, Sept. 19, 1997.
101. Thrifty, 212 B.R. at 149.
102. See id.
103. See id. GWR borrowed an additional $7 million approximately fifteen
months later.
104. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussing plain vanilla
interest rate swaps).
105. See Thrifty, 212 B.R. at 149. The swaps were composed of three
transactions entered into over a forty day period with an aggregate notional
amount of $45 million, the same as the loan. In the swaps, the fixed rates were
9.125%, 8.96%, and 8.66%, respectively. See Declaration of Leslie Reuter In
Response to Claim Objection, Confirmations attached as exhibits, Case No. 92-
09132-All (Oct. 31, 1996).
106. Id. Thrifty also agreed to guarantee the loan obligations of GWR. Id.
Thrifty became involved because, one day before the loan closing, it executed an
agreement to guarantee GWR's obligations in both the loan and also the
derivative transaction. Thrifty's relationship to GWR, or its reasons for the
guarantee, are undisclosed in the case.
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both parties had indicated that the interest rate swaps were
to occur concurrently with the closing of the loan.
GWR filed for bankruptcy approximately two years
after closing the loan. Pursuant to the terms of the swaps,
BofA terminated the swaps and filed a claim in bankruptcy
for damages. °7  Thrifty, as the guarantor of GWR's
obligations under the interest rate swaps with BofA,
objected to BofA's claim for damages.' °8 Thrifty, in its
capacity as guarantor, rejected BofA's claim and argued
that the loan agreement and the swap agreement should be
characterized together as a "fixed rate loan." Under such a
characterization, the termination payments under the swap
would constitute a claim for "post-petition interest," which
is disallowed as unmatured interest under the Bankruptcy
Code. °9
Thrifty's argument can be demonstrated through a
numerical example. Assume that both the principal amount
of the loan and the aggregate notional amount of the
interest rate swaps were $50 million. Also, assume that the
variable interest rate charged by BofA was 8%."' Further,
assume that the fixed rate payable by GWR was 10%.
Finally, assume that both interest payments and swap
payments were only made at the end of the year.
On the payment date in Year One, GWR would make
107. The damages were in the amount of $5,428,500. See Thrifty, 212 B.R.
at 149. The calculation of the termination payment under the ISDA Master
Agreement was not contested by Thrifty, other than Thrifty's characterization
of the payment as unmatured interest.
108. See id. at 150. Thrifty also made an argument based on California law.
109. Id. Thrifty's claim was that the termination amount violated the
Bankruptcy Code's prohibitions on post-petition or unmatured interest. Thrifty
argued that the loan and interest rate swaps should be integrated into one
synthetic fixed rate loan. Under this characterization, any claim for damages
under the swaps would be characterized as unmatured interest. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, a creditor cannot claim post petition or unmatured interest
against a bankrupt party that accrues after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy.
Section 502 of Bankruptcy Code prohibits a claim for "unmatured interest" if a
valid objection is made to the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (1994). For a general
discussion of Section 502, see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY % 502.01 (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1999); 2 WiLLiAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 28 (2d ed. 1991); DANIEL R. COwANS, COwANs BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 12 (1994). Unmatured interest is interest that has accrued
on claims after the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See COLLIER,
supra, 502.03 [3] [a].
110. The facts in the case do not set forth what LIBOR or the reference rate
was at the date of bankruptcy filing. See Thrifty, 212 B.R. at 149.
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an interest payment to BofA of $4 million."' Under the
interest rate swap, GWR would make a net payment of
$1,000,000.112 Taken together, GWR has made a total
payment of $5 million to BofA with respect to the combined
loan and swap transaction. This is the same amount that
GWR would have paid BofA if they had merely taken a loan
within a fixed interest rate of 10%, the same fixed rate
payable by GWR under the swaps. GWR argued that, if the
two transactions are integrated together, the economic
effect is identical with a fixed rate loan.
In considering Thrifty's argument, the court determined
that Thrifty would need to establish that the swap
payments were in substance interest payments paid on
borrowed money."' Thrifty needed to demonstrate that the
swap agreement was actually a part of the loan agreement,
and not a separate transaction. In considering whether
there was in substance a fixed rate loan, the court analyzed
the objective intent of the parties when the two
transactions were negotiated. The court measured this
objective intent based upon two factors: (1) the loan
documents; and (2) the "extrinsic evidence of intent, such as
the books and records of the parties, accounting practices,
regulatory treatment of the transaction, and trade custom
and usage.""4 After analyzing these factors, the court
determined that the objective intent of the parties was to
enter into two separate transactions."' As a result, the
court found that the termination payments under the swap
were not unmatured interest.
6
After Thrifty, it has become extremely difficult in a
bankruptcy context to argue that a loan coupled with a
separate interest rate swap should be integrated into a
single synthetic fixed rate loan. Although unstated in the
111. $50 million multiplied by the reference rate of 8% equals $4 million.
112. $50 million multiplied by the floating rate of 8% equals $4 million. $50
million multiplied by the fixed rate of 10% equals $5 million. The net payment
of $1 million payable by GWR under the swap would be the difference between
the fixed payment of $5 million payable by GWR less the variable rate payment
payable by BofA of $4 million.
113. "Interest is money 'paid to compensate for the delay and risk involved
in the ultimate repayment of monies loaned.'" Thrifty, 212 B.R. at 150 (quoting
In re Pengo Indus., Inc., 962 F.2d 543, 546 (5th Cir. 1992)).
114. Thrifty, 212 B.R. at 151 (citing In re Comark, 145 B.R. 47, 53 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1992).
115. See id. at 154.
116. See id.
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opinion, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is extremely friendly
towards OTC derivatives, providing substantial protections
for the provider of an OTC derivative to bankrupt debtor."7
The legislative history is indicative of the lengths to which
Congress has gone to protect creditors who have entered
into OTC derivatives and the OTC derivative market."8
Had the bankruptcy court held against BofA, many of these
concerns and statutory changes would have been
eviscerated, possibly even harming the OTC derivative
market.
It would, however, probably be inappropriate to apply
the Thrifty holding in the antitying context. Courts have
taken an aggressive stance in the antitrust area by looking
to the substance of transaction."9 They may be much more
willing to integrate the loan and OTC derivative for
purposes of determining the applicability of the antitying
provisions as they look to the general market and the broad
goals and purposes of antitrust law.
117. For a general discussion of the treatment of derivatives under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, see Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Memorandum of Law for the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Over-the-Counter Derivatives
Transactions: Netting Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, FIRREA, and FDICIA
(June 22, 1993); Martin J. Bienenstock, Understanding the Business,
Bankruptcy and Securities Aspects of Derivatives, in DERIVATIVES UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE 11 (P.L.I. Com. L. & Practice, Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. 721, 1995); Moody's Investors Service, Global Credit Research, The
Status of Swap Agreements Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (June 1994)
(general discussion); MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, Derivatives Claims Under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code: Implications for Counterparty Ratings (Oct. 1994); John
C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and End Users, 112 BANKING L. J.
639 (1995); Scot Tucker, Interest Rate Swaps and the 1990 Amendments to the
United States Bankruptcy Code: A Measure of Certainty Within Swap Market
Contracts, Interest Rate Swaps and the 1990 Amendments to the United States
Bankruptcy Code: A Measure of Certainty with Swap Market Contracts, 1991
UTAH L. REV. 581.
118. Bankruptcy: Swap Agreements and Forward Contracts, House Report
No. 101-484 (May 14, 1990), 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223 (1990); see also Bankruptcy
Treatment of Swap Agreements and Forward Contracts, H.R. Rep. No. 484,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 223
(discussing uncertainties); J. C. Dugan, Derivatives: Netting, Insolvency, and
End Users, 112 BANKING L. J. 638 (1995) (discussing the legal risks for a
participant in bankruptcy without swap friendly provisions); Tucker, supra note
117, at 581.
119. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597 (1951).
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4. Implied Tie. One commentator has suggested that
an implied tie-in requirement might constitute a violation
of the BHCA antitying provisions. Although a borrower's
decision to voluntarily purchase a second product or service
from a bank would not trigger liability,21 an implied or
implicit tie may be indicative of an illegal tying
arrangement. In an implied tie-in, it is understood by the
borrower that it should enter into the OTC derivative with
the bank even if it is not expressly required-failure to do
so could result in a bank not extending credit the next time.
Bankers may put implied pressure on the borrower to
enter into the OTC derivative with the bank itself. There is
currently tremendous pressure on bankers to cross-sell
products that their banks offer to customers. 2 ' Bonuses and
other compensation might be tied to the banker's ability to
put these transactions into place. The banker could imply to
the borrower that if the borrower were to shop around for
the OTC derivative, there may be adverse consequences
120. See CHARLES G. BLAINE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES § 12.16 (1973) ("While... it would be difficult to prove [an implied]
condition or requirement .... assuming that the exact discussion [implying a
condition] could be proved, might tend to indicate that a condition or
requirement was part of the arrangement... [Banks should] avoid
transactions... creating factual circumstances from which a court might infer
an impliedly prohibited transaction.").
121. See id. ("It seems clear for a number of reasons that such [voluntary]
tying effects are not prohibited... , but principally because by definition they
are voluntary on the part of the customer and are not part of any 'condition or
requirement' of the bank.").
122. See Brian Nixon, De-Commoditizing Mortgage Lending, COMMUNITY
BANKER, May 2000, at 22-25 (discussing cross-selling); Heike Wipperfurth,
HSBC Bites Big Apple Again: Ad Campaign Touts New New York Holding,
INvESTMENT NEWS, Apr. 24, 2000, at 34; Kenneth Cline, Revenue Play, BANKING
STRATEGIES, May 2000, at 19 ("The edifice of cross-selling must be built on a
foundation of tremendous persistence and discipline."); Gerald C. Vigneron,
Where Banking and Insurance Meet, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 1999, at 7, 14
("Insurance sales is a natural fit for community banks looking to expand their
offerings and increase revenues and profits."); Investment Products, A1.i.
BANKER (Sept. 1, 2000), at 1 (stating that a bank competes "by cross-selling
products"); Mathew A. Riebel, Partners Can Help Banks Sell Small-Biz
Retirement Plans, AAI. BANKER, Aug. 25, 2000, at 12 ("Barriers have come down
at these banks. Their trust departments are more willing to share customers,
allowing cross-selling of products."); Liz Moyer, Citi Puts Lipp at Helm of Cross-
Selling Efforts, AM. BANKER, July 24, 2000, at 1 ("[C]ross-selling of products and
services for corporations... has come more easily than expected.").
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with respect to their banking relationship.
For example, it may become clear to the borrower that
the pricing of the loan may not be as favorable if the OTC
derivative were not done with the bank. The bank could
also make clear that it might be less flexible with respect to
future negotiations or problems. Although there may be
difficulty proving such an understanding, there would
appear to be little substantive reason to distinguish
between this and an express requirement to enter into the
OTC derivative with the bank for purposes of establishing
liability under the BHCA antitying provisions.
5. Inadvertent Tie. Apart from either an express or
implied tie, a borrower may still discover that the bank is
the only party willing to enter into the OTC derivative."
Whether that creates an inadvertent tying arrangement for
purposes of the BHCA is unclear. It may depend upon
whether the bank structured the relationship and
documentation with the intent that the borrower could only
enter into the OTC derivative with the bank. Again, it
would be inappropriate to distinguish between an express
requirement to enter into the OTC derivative with the bank
versus one in which a bank structured its dealings in such a
way that the bank was the only derivative counterparty
available to enter into the transaction.
B. Anticompetitive Practice
To constitute a violation of the antitying provisions
under the BHCA, courts have generally required a plaintiff
to show an anticompetitive tying arrangement. This is
demonstrated by showing that a practice is "anticompetitive
in nature" or an "anticompetitive practice."'24 Courts,
however, have not required a plaintiff to show an anti-
competitive effect from the tying arrangement. This makes
it potentially easier to establish that a bank has violated
the antitying provisions when it requires the borrower to
123. A bank that is also a borrower's dealer has developed a special
relationship with the borrower that may not be easily replicated by another
dealer. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
124. Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., 92 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 1996);
Palermo v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 894 F.2d 363, 368
(10th Cir. 1990); Johnstone v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1220, 1225
(N.D. Ill. 1996).
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enter into an OTC derivative with the bank as a condition
for receiving credit.
The BHCA has commonly been distinguished from the
Sherman and Clayton Acts "in its focus on the interests of
the individual credit consumer, rather than on competition
at large. The antitying provisions broadly proscribes
tying... without requiring proof of economic power or a
significant effect on commerce."' In passing the BHCA,
Congress recognized the unique nature of the banking
industry and the role it plays in the economy.2 ' It also
recognized the difficulties in establishing an antitrust
violation where a bank is involved.'
Under the Sherman Act, to show a tying arrangement
violation, the plaintiff must show that the tie had an anti-
competitive effect. This is done by establishing that: (1) the
defendant possesses market power over the tying product to
force the purchase of the tied product; and (2) "a substantial
volume of commerce is foreclosed thereby.""
Unlike a plaintiff bringing a cause of action under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, however, a plaintiff bringing a
claim under the BHCA does not need to prove anti-
competitive effects or appreciable market share in the
market for the tying product.'29
The Tenth Circuit differentiated between
"anticompetitive effects" and "anticompetitive practice." The
court explained that anticompetitive effects include such
things as a bank's dominance or control over the tying
product market, or that a substantial volume of commerce
125. William M. Hannay & William A. Montgomery, Tying Arrangements:
Practice Under Federal Antitrust, Patent, and Banking Law, in The Bureau of
National Affairs, Inc. (Corp. Practice Series No. 39-2nd, Feb. 1997, at A-49).
126. See S & N Equip. Co. v. Casa Grande Cotton Fin. Co., 97 F.3d 337, 346
(9th Cir. 1996); Dibidale of La., Inc. v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d 300, 305
(5th Cir. 1990); JST Properties v. First Natl Bank of Glencoe, 701 F. Supp.
1443, 1449 (D. Minn. 1988); S. REP. No. 91-1084, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N
5519, 5558.
127. See JST Properties, 701 F. Supp. at 1449 (quoting Timothy Naegele,
The Antitying Provision: Its Potential is Still There, 100 BANKING L. J. 138, 143
(1983)) (footnotes omitted).
128. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-16 (1984).
129. See JST Properties, 701 F. Supp. at 1449 ; Doe v. Norwest Bank, Minn.,
N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1305 (8th Cir. 1997); Dibidale ofLa., Inc, 916 F.2d at 305;
Bruce v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Conroe, Inc., 837 F.2d 712, 717 (5th
Cir. 1988); Amerifirst Properties, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 880 F.2d 821,
825 (5th Cir. 1989); Gage v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Hutchinson, Kan.,
717 F. Supp. 745, 752 (D. Kan. 1989); S & NEquip. Co., 97 F.3d at 346.
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is affected. 3 ° These examples are, for all intensive purposes,
the same as the elements that must be shown in a general
antitrust case.'
Only having to show an anticompetitive practice versus
an anticompetitive effect is an important distinction for
plaintiffs suing under the BHCA. By the very nature of the
elements to be proven, showing an anticompetitive practice
is far easier than showing anticompetitive effects. One
court explained why there is a less stringent standard in
proving a violation of the antitying provisions of the BHCA
In enacting the antitying provision of the BHCA,
Congress recognized that tying arrangements in the
banking industry generally involve such small dollar
amounts that they do not justify expensive and time-
consuming antitrust litigation. Congress also recognized the
difficulties in establishing an antitrust violation, since it is
doubtful whether a bank customer could adduce sufficient
evidence of the bank's market power and the effect on
interstate commerce to recover under the Sherman Act.
Thus, even if evidence of market power and the effect on
interstate commerce are insufficient to state a cause of
action under the Sherman Act, a litigant can still recover
under Section 1972 of the BHCA."1
2
The different standards can be demonstrated with
respect to a transaction in which a borrower is required to
enter into an OTC derivative as condition to receiving credit
from a bank. Under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff has to
show that the bank has enough power in the loan market
(tying product) to force the borrower to accept the OTC
derivative (tied product). Second, the plaintiff must
establish that the bank's power in the loan market caused
other lenders to be unable to compete in that market.
In contrast, under the BHCA, a plaintiff needs only to
establish that the tying arrangement was anticompetitive
in nature. 3' Therefore, in a situation involving OTC
130. See Palermo v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 894
F.2d 363, 368 (10th Cir. 1990); Davis v. First Natl Bank of Westville, 868 F.2d
206, 208 (7th Cir. 1989); Doe, 107 F.3d at 1305.
131. See Palermo, 894 F.2d at 368; Doe, 107 F.3d at 1305.
132. See JST Properties, 701 F. Supp. at 1449 (quoting Naegele, supra note
127, at 143).
133. See Palermo, 894 F.2d at 368 ; Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, 92 F.3d
384 (6th Cir. 1996); Johnstone v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 1998 WL 565193 at *'5
(N.D. Ill. 1998).
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derivatives, the plaintiff would need to show: (1) that
requiring the borrower to obtain a swap along with his loan
is a tying arrangement; and (2) that the tying of the loan
and the swap is anticompetitive in nature. To establish the
latter requirement, the plaintiff only needs to show that the
tying arrangement was intended to be anticompetitive or
that such a relationship could possibly lessen competition.'
For example, the plaintiff would probably only need to show
that there were other banks willing to enter into the OTC
derivative in order to show that the tying was
anticompetitive in nature.
Some courts have made it even more simple by
employing a per se approach to determine if there was a
violation of the antitying provisions of the BHCA."5 This
approach merely requires that the plaintiff show the
existence of a conditional transaction in the extension of
credit by a bank.'36 The courts have explained the need for a
per se approach because the economic power of banks is
such that "even small banks could misuse their economic
power to the detriment of bank customers.""' The
presumption is that a tying arrangement involving a bank
is anticompetitive. The court in S&N Equipment Co. v.
Casa Grande Cotton Fin. Co. shows their belief in a
presumption of anticompetitiveness by stating, "while our
test speaks in terms of an 'anti-competitive' tying, the
modifier either drops out or is presumed to exist."'
This per se approach would be more difficult to defend
against by a bank that tied an OTC derivative to the
extension of credit to the borrower. The plaintiff borrower
would only need to show that there was a tying transaction
and would not need to show that there were other banks
willing to enter into the OTC derivative. This would
seriously weaken the bank's defense in that it conceivably
could have shown that it was in fact the only bank willing
to extend credit while at the same time providing an OTC
134. See Palermo, 894 F.2d at 368; Doe, 107 F.3d at 1305.
135. See JST Properties, 701 F. Supp. at 1449; Dibidale of La., Inc. v. Am.
Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d 300, 305-06 (5th Cir. 1990); S & N Equip. Co. v.
Casa Grande Cotton Fin. Co., 97 F.3d 337, 346 (9th Cir. 1996); Sharkey v.
Security Bank & Trust, Co., 651 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (D. Minn. 1987).
136. See Dibidale of La., Inc., 916 F.2d at 305.
137. JSTProperties, 701 F. Supp. at 1449.
138. S & N Equip. Co, 97 F.3d at 346.
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derivative to the borrower. 39
There are several situations in which the antitying
provisions should not apply because such a tie would not be
anticompetitive in nature. This would occur when only the
bank making the loan would be willing to enter into the
OTC derivative with the borrower. To the extent that the
borrower could not go elsewhere to obtain the OTC
derivative, the tie should not be anticompetitive in nature.
It would be inappropriate to prohibit the bank from
providing an otherwise useful hedging arrangement
through the use of OTC derivatives solely because it was
the only dealer in the OTC derivatives market willing to
enter into the transaction.
There are several reasons why the lender bank may be
the only bank willing to enter into an OTC derivative with
the borrower. Other dealers may be unwilling to trade with
a borrower if the borrower has already pledged or
encumbered all of its assets for the benefit of the lending
bank. Many banks will require a borrower to pledge assets
or grant a security interest in their property prior to
making a loan to the borrower. In fact, a bank may take a
blanket lien on all of the borrower's property if the bank
feels it is at risk. Often, this blanket lien would secure not
only the loan made to the borrower, but would also include
any other obligations and liabilities of the borrower to the
bank, including any OTC derivative obligations.
The absence of any collateral that a borrower could
pledge to a third party derivative dealer may seriously
narrow the number of dealers willing to trade with a
borrower. 4° Before entering into an OTC derivative with a
potential customer, a dealer will ascertain if it needs to, or
will be able to, secure with collateral the credit exposure of
the borrower under the OTC derivative. A dealer entering
into a transaction with the borrower assumes the risk of the
possibility that the borrower may fail to perform.' This
139. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
140. See Peter Thompson, Learning Curve, Collaterization Agreements,
DERIVATIVES WEEK, July 10, 1995, at 10 (collateralization allows highly rated
counterparties "to trade with counterparties that do not meet their typically
high counterparty credit rating criteria."); Romano, supra note 26, at 51 ("[L]ow
credit counterparties typically must post collateral or provide other security
guaranteeing payment in order to participate in the market.").
141. See Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV.
1993, 2011 (1995) (identifying credit risk as one of thirteen risks in the
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risk is referred to as "credit risk."
Although there are other methods to reduce credit risk,
there appears to be a general perception in the marketplace
that pledging collateral is the best solution to the
problem. Requiring collateral to be pledged does not
completely eliminate credit risk, but it may provide a
sufficient reduction of risk that the lender will be willing to
enter into a transaction with the borrower." Thus, the
pledging of collateral by counterparties to each other is
becoming increasingly important in the derivatives area.'"
Both dealers and non-dealers are beginnin to insist on the
collateralization of OTC derivatives,' with many
anticipating that eventually all OTC derivatives will be
secured by collateral. 4 ' Many bank dealers also may be
unwilling to deal with the borrower on an unsecured basis
for bank regulatory reasons.47 Certain financial institutions
derivative area).
142. See Thompson, supra note 140, at 10 ("Collateralizing transactions
with counterparties allows credit risk to be quantified and nullified."); Meigs,
supra note 90, at 11; Bank Regulators Offer a Way to Reduce the Capital
Requirement for Derivatives, SwAPs MONITOR, Sept. 11, 1995, at 3 ("To date, the
market has decided that collateral is the superior means of reducing credit risk
and economizing on capital."); Suzanne McGee, "Plain Vanilla" Derivatives Can
Also Be Poison, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1995, at C1 (noting that parties are
reducing counterparty credit risk by requiring collateral).
143. If the borrower has an "unquestioned" credit rating, it may not be
required to post any collateral. See Thomas Moers Mayer, Derivatives in
Default: Getting Collateral, in UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS, BANKRUPTCY AND
SECURITIES ASPECTS OF DERIVATIVES 123 (P.L.I. Com. L. & Practice, Practice
Handbook Series No. 721, 1995).
144. See Collateral Usage Continues to Grow, But Standards Remain
Elusive, SwAPs MONITOR, Nov. 22, 1993, at 1.
145. The posting of collateral has been around for a decade, ever since the
thrift industry began using swaps. However, in recent years the emphasis has
moved away from dealers protecting themselves from customers. Today, the
emphasis of collateral arrangements is on dealers protecting themselves from
each other, and on end-users protecting themselves from dealers. See JOINT
STUDY, supra note 6, at 15 ("Counterparties routinely reduce exposures to
weakening institutions by... requiring margin to reduce risk").
146. See Collateral Usage Continues to Grow, But Standards Remain
Elusive, supra note 144, at 5 ("Some dealers expect that, within a few years, all
trades between professionals will be collateralized."); J. A. Gluck, Measuring
and Controlling the Credit Risk of Derivatives, in DERIVATIVES RISK AND
RESPONSmITY 156-57 (R.A. Klein & J. Ledermand eds. 1996); J. A. Ratcliffe,
U.S. OTC Market Seen Looking to Collateralize Swaps, REUTERS, Nov. 3, 1994.
147. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Derivative Transactions, 60 Fed.
Reg. 46, 170, 46, 172 (Sept. 5, 1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225,
325). For a discussion of the rules, see Michael T. Cowhig & Seema A. Misra,
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are able to reduce the capital that they are required to hold
against certain OTC derivatives if their OTC derivative
exposure is collateralized.'
A borrower may also discover that other banks or
dealers are unwilling to enter into OTC derivatives with it
if the borrower is a smaller company that will only enter
into OTC derivatives on an infrequent basis. This is
because the dealer is unable to assess the credit quality of
the borrower. In contrast, a bank that is already a lender
has already conducted much of the due diligence with
respect to the creditworthiness of the borrower1 in
conjunction with its lending activities to the borrower. A
derivatives dealer may not be willing to invest the time and
energy necessary to do sufficient due diligence to assess the
borrower's credit quality. Finally, an outside dealer will not
have the relationship of trust and understanding with the
bank's loan and credit officers, 50 resulting in it being unable
to gain the trust of the borrower.
Even if the dealer is willing to enter into an OTC
derivative with the borrower, it may be unable to offer it a
competitive price because the transaction is not secured,
and due to its inadequate understanding of the borrower's
credit quality. The presence of collateral securing an
obligation will typically result in the secured party being
able to provide better terms and pricing for the derivative
Derivatives, 15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 28 (1996); see also Fed Rules Benefit
Collateralized Deals, But Banks Lobby for Other Changes, SwAPs MONITOR, Dec.
26, 1994, at 1 ("[Tlhis provision is likely to spur growth in the use of collateral
for counterparties.").
148. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Derivative Transactions, 60 Fed.
Reg. 46, 172 (Sept. 5, 1995) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325);
Fed Rules Benefit Collateralized Deals, But Banks Lobby for Other Changes,
supra note 144, at 1 (summarizing rules); US Bank Regulators Have Different
Policies on Collateral, SwAPs MONITOR, Sept. 11, 1995 (discussing the use of
collateralization to reduce capital requirements).
149. See HAYES, supra note 62, at 82 ("[W]ithout exception, large banks
maintain credit files on all business borrowers."). "As in all credit-sensitive
agreements, '[kinow your counterparty."' There is no substitute for good,
fundamental credit analysis and first hand knowledge of the counterparty and
its principals." Rahl, supra note 20, at 336; see also Baird, supra note 62, at 302-
03. (stating that due diligence regarding the borrower's financial situation is
not just important for the lender but also for the dealer acting as the borrower's
counterparty).
150. See HAYES, supra note 62, at 81 ('"The relationship between banks and
their commercial borrowers has the following characteristics: (1) There are
usually close and confidential relations between the bank and the borrower.").
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obligation.'
C. Benefit to the Bank
Courts have generally held that the plaintiff must
establish that there was a benefit to the bank from the sale
of the tied product or service to the borrower.'52 There is a
distinction, however, "between anticompetitive benefits and
the ordinary benefits derived from the protection of a bank's
security in a customer loan."5 ' The type of benefit referred
to in the antitying statute is "one which results not from the
legitimate protection of an investment, but from a 'misuse
of the economic power of a bank.' ,"" A number of cases
have agreed that a banking practice intended to protect the
bank's investment interest is permissible under the BHCA
because it is not considered to be a benefit under the
various judicial holdings.'55 The courts have held that a
number of conditions are legitimate to protect the Bank's
investment interest, and are therefore not violations of the
BHCA.
156
The principal benefit to the bank would appear to be
151. See William C. Tompsett, 101 BANKING L. J. 31, 36 (1984) (noting that
most commercial loans are intended to pass on interest rate risk to the
borrower. The borrower may negotiate certain provisions, such as collateral, to
improve the pricing and get the lowest possible rate.)
152. Swerdloff v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 584 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1978); McCoy v.
Franklin Sav. Ass'n., 636 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1980); Continental Ill. Natl
Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, 585 F Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Rae v. Union
Bank, 725 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, N.A.,
679 F.2d 242 (11th Cir. 1982); see also James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., What
Constitutes Violation of Provisions of Bank Holding Company Act Prohibiting
Tying Arrangements, 74 A.L.R. FED. 578, § 4(c) (1985).
153. Cont'l Bank of Pa. v. Barclay Riding Acad., Inc., 459 A.2d 1163, 1170
(N.J. 1983).
154. Id. (quoting Swerdloff, 584 F.2d at 58).
155. See New England Co. v. Bank of Gwinnett County, 891 F. Supp. 1569,
1575 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see also Parsons Steel, 679 F.2d at 246; Pappas v. NCNB
Nat'l Bank, 653 F. Supp. 699, 706 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
156. Alpine Elec. Co. v. Union Bank, 776 F. Supp. 486, 490 (W.D. Mo. 1991)
affd, 979 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that act of bank in using money in
depositor's checking account to reduce debt of related corporation was not
actionable); see also Bieber v. State Bank of Terry, 928 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir.
1991) (requiring officers of corporation to personally guaranty loan of
corporation); Palermo v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 894 F.2d 363, 370 (10th
Cir. 1990) (requiring officers to personally guaranty loan of corporation); Davis
v. First Natl Bank, 868 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing a bank
requiring debtor to provide a business liquidation service).
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the its investment in the borrower. As discussed earlier, the
protection of OTC derivatives can result in significant
benefits in reducing various business risks of the
borrower.'57
Apart from the benefit enjoyed by the bank from an
improvement in the creditworthiness of its counterparty
because of the OTC derivative, a bank could benefit other
ways. First, the bank could potentially charge fees for
providing the transaction, or could receive an up-front
premium payment for providing a transaction such as a
cap.'58 Second, the tied transaction may help the bank hedge
risks that it has taken as an intermediary with a different
counterparty. For example, the bank may have previously
done the opposite of the OTC derivative with a different
counterparty. By entering into the OTC derivative with the
borrower, it is able to offset the risk taken under a different
OTC derivative with a different party. Finally, to the extent
that the relevant index or rate moves in the favor of the
bank, the bank will benefit by receiving payments from the
borrower under the tied transaction.
Two cases have directly discussed the benefit to the
bank beyond the permissible benefit of protecting the
bank's investment interest. For example, in Gage v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, the bank required the borrower to
grant the bank an option to purchase a portion of the
plaintiffs building.'59 The court determined that the bank
did indeed benefit by purchasing a portion of the building at
the borrower's expense.' In addition, the bank did not need
any additional protection for its loan. Furthermore, the
option did not in fact give the bank any more protection.
With respect to tying credit to OTC derivatives, it is
arguable that any ancillary, outside benefit to the bank
should be secondary to the benefit provided of protecting
the bank's investment in the borrower. Although a bank
may benefit financially from the tied product as discussed
above, this benefit is only incidental and flows from the
actions taken to protect the bank's investment.
It would be unreasonable to prohibit this important
157. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of a premium payment with a cap, see infra note 174
and accompanying text.
159. See Gage v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 717 F. Supp. 745, 754 (D.
Kan. 1989).
160. See id.
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banking practice under the antitying rules if the bank's
primary motivation were to protect its investment in the
borrower, as opposed to earning income. As noted in the
above case law, in cases where a benefit to the bank was
found, requiring the tied product had nothing to do with
protecting the bank's investment in the borrower.
D. Damages
To recover under the antitying provisions, the borrower
must demonstrate that "damages flow[ed]" 6' as a result of
the product being tied to the extension of credit.162 There
appears, however, to be no judicial authority as to how
damages are actually calculated for a violation of the BHCA
antitying provisions. Because the language providing for
damages under the BHCA is almost identical to language in
the Clayton Act, it would be reasonable to look to the same
analysis."
The Fourth Circuit summarized what must be
established for a private plaintiff to prove damages under
the antitying provisions of the Clayton Act:
[Ilnjury resulting from a tie-in must be shown by establishing that
payments for both the tied and the tying product exceeded their
combined fair market value... Unless the fair market value of
both the tied and tying products are determined and an
overcharge in the complete price found, no injury can be claimed;
suit, then, would be foreclosed."'
Under this analysis, the plaintiff would need to
161. Sterling Coal Co. v. United Am. Bank, 470 F. Supp. 964, 965 (E.D.
Tenn. 1979).
162. Swerdloffv. Miami Natl Bank, 584 F.2d 54, 59 (5th Cir. 1978); Costner
v. Blount Natl Bank, 578 F.2d 1192, 1195 (6th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of
damages under the BHCA, see Fredrick A. Nicoll & Robert W. Delventhal, The
Antitying Provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act: Lenders Beware, 109
BANKING L.J. 4, 18-24 (1992); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What
Constitutes Violation of Provisions of Bank Holding Company Act Prohibiting
Tying Arrangements, 74 A.L.R. FED. 578, § 4[e] (1985).
163. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1989) (BHCA), with 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994)
(Clayton Act).
164. Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 671 F.2d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 1982); see
also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971). For a
general discussion of damages under the Clayton Act for a violation of the
antitying provisions, see SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 1 (Jeffrey L. Kessler ed., West 1999).
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compare the combined cost on a net present value basis of
the bank loan and the OTC derivative with the cost of
obtaining a bank loan and an OTC derivative separately
from third parties. It is not enough to show that the bank
offered expensive OTC derivatives if the bank loan was
sufficiently inexpensive to offset the higher cost.
The cost of the loan could probably be calculated by
comparing, on a net present value basis, how much more (or
less) interest, fees, and other expenses the borrower might
have paid under the loan in question versus a loan that it
could have obtained from another bank. The calculation of
the cost of the OTC derivative would probably be more
complicated.
Typically the overall cost of the OTC derivative would
be measured by determining what would be the net
termination amount for the OTC derivative upon the date
the OTC derivative was terminated. The net termination
amount is the amount that the borrower would be required
to pay to the bank if its agreement with the bank were
terminated.'65 Under the standard documentation in the
OTC derivative area,166 the net termination amount is
typically measured by determining the "replacement cost"
of the transaction should the borrower default.'67 In other
words, how much would a new participant be required to
pay or be paid to assume the obligations of the defaulting
party in the transaction?1" This amount is measured by
165. This amount is determined under the ISDA Master Agreement
pursuant to Section 6(e). This amount may vary depending upon the method of
calculating these damages selected by the parties. See ISDA Master Agreement,
§ 6(e)(i)-(ii) (1992).
166. Ninety percent of the notional amount of interest rate swaps entered
into between dealers were documented using an ISDA Master Agreement. See
G30 Resurveys Dealers, SWAPS MONITOR, Dec. 12, 1994, at 9; Thomas K. Patton,
Hedging Debt with Derivatives: Using Swaps and Options to Manage Interest
Rate Risk, CORP. CASHFLOW MAG., Aug. 1995, at 16 ("Most swaps are written
with an ISDA agreement."); Christian A. Johnson, Derivatives and
Rehypothecation Failure: It's 3:00p.m., Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 949 n.37 (1997).
167. JOINT STUDY, supra note 6, at 9 ("[The replacement cost or the positive
market value (if any) of the swap is the preferred measure for assessing the
amount of credit exposure if the counterparty to the agreement defaults."). For
a discussion of the calculation of replacement cost, see Waldman, supra note 88,
at 1048. For a discussion of modeling credit risk in the derivatives area, see
SABER, supra note 26, at 83-93.
168. This is the underlying concept of "Market Quotation" in the Master
Agreement. Market Quotation is the method of calculating the amount to be
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determining the present value of the net cash flow that the
new participant expects that it will have to pay (or receive)
during the life of the OTC derivative contract."
Presumably, in analyzing the respective costs, the cost
of providing the OTC derivative would need to take into
account the facts or circumstances of that particular
plaintiffs situation. For example, an OTC derivative
entered into with a third party might be more expensive
because the third party would be unsecured in the event
that the plaintiff had previously pledged all available
collateral to the defendant bank as part of its loan
transaction.7 '
E. Traditional Banking Practice Exception
The final requirement is that tying of an OTC
derivative to the extension of credit does not constitute a
traditional banking practice. 7' In addition, if liability is
predicated under subsection (1)(C) of Section 1972, it does
not constitute an unusual banking practice. Requiring a
borrower to enter into an OTC derivative, even with the
bank itself, as a condition to the extension of credit should
be considered a traditional banking practice because of the
benefits that an OTC derivative can have in making the
borrower more creditworthy.
1. Traditional Banking Practice. The BHCA antitying
provisions were not intended to prohibit transactions and
relationships involving what are now referred to as
paid by the parties to the Master Agreement upon its termination caused, for
example, by a payment default. See ISDA Master Agreement § 14 (1992)
(defining Market Quotation); ISDA User's Guide 24-26 (1993).
169. See Waldman, supra note 88, at 1048; see also JOINT STUDY, supra note
6 at 9; Meigs, supra note 90 ("The amount of the credit risk can be measured
[for an interest rate swap] using the present values of net cash flows given
specific interest rate assumptions."); Jamroz, supra note 90.
170. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
171. There is also an exception to liability if, under the BHCA, the Federal
Reserve permits by order "such exceptions to the [antitying provisions] as it
considers will not be contrary to the purposes" of the BHCA. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(1)
(1994) (last clause). It has exercised such authority sparingly however, and not
with respect to OTC derivatives. See Nicoll & Delventhal, supra note 162, at 6;
see also Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225
(1990) (discussing limited exception for credit card transactions).
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traditional banking practices.'72 The exception has grown
out of the language found in statute providing that
antitying prohibitions will not cover tied products such as
"a loan, discount, deposit or trust service."'73 Requiring a
borrower to hedge its business risks by using OTC
derivatives provided by the lending bank is a prototypical
example of a traditional banking practice.
17 4
Courts have refused to limit the traditional banking
practice exception to the specified tied products such as "a
loan, discount, deposit or trust service." The federal district
court in Flags I, Inc. v. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank,7 '
explained the reach of the traditional banking practice
exemption.'76 The court noted that committee members
drafting the statute were not satisfied with the statute as it
stood because it prohibited all tying arrangements even
though these arrangements were not anticompetitive.'77 In
response, the exemptions were added several months later
to permit legitimate banking practices that have no
172. See Flags I, Inc. v. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank, 831 F. Supp. 928, 936
(D.N.H. 1993); see also Sanders v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 936 F.2d 273,
278 (6th Cir. 1991); B.C. Recreational Indus. v. First Natl Bank, 639 F.2d 828,
832 (1st Cir. 1981); Clark v. United Bank of Denver N.A., 480 F.2d 235, 238
(10th Cir. 1973); Libby v. Firstar Bank of Sheboygan, 47 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139
(D. Mass. 1999); Alpine Elec. Co. v. Union Bank, 776 F. Supp. 486, 489 (W.D.
Mo. 1991) affd, 979 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1992); Pappas v. NCNB Natl Bank, 653
F. Supp. 699, 705 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
173. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
174. For a discussion the traditional banking practices exception, see
Chapelle, supra note 73, at 719-22 (discussing exceptions); Finke et al., supra
note 86, at 184-85 (discussing the "traditional banking practice" exception); see
also Alan J. Berkeley & Jean E. Minarick, Disclosure and Developments in
Financing Instruments and Techniques, in 703 PLI/CoRP ADVANCED SECURITIES
LAW WORKSHOP 335, 364 (1990) ("Many lenders are requiring borrowers to buy
interest caps in order to hedge at least some of their debt. The cap would protect
the borrower, and therefore the bank, in the event of a general increase in
interest rates.... Some degree of lender control over the choice of the
counterparty seems necessary, however, since the counterparty must be
exceptionally creditworthy for large transactions.").
175. 831 F. Supp. at 936.
176. The exception involved a claim under the Home Owner's Loan Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1464(q)(1) (1989). HOLA is considered to be the savings association
equivalent of the BHCA and therefore its analysis should be applicable to the
BHCA. See id. at 934; see also Integon Life Ins. Corp. v. Browning, 989 F.2d
1143, 1150 (11th Cir. 1993); Bruce v. First Fed. Say. & Loan, 837 F.2d 712, 716
(5th Cir. 1988).
177. See Flags I, 831 F. Supp at 934-35.
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anticompetitive effect.'
In analyzing the judicial history of the exemption, the
court in Flags I, Inc. v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank noted
that courts should look broadly to the effect of the
arrangement instead of determining whether the
arrangement was common in the banking industry.' The
key factor for the court in Flags was whether the tie
occurred where the bank was protecting its interest in the
investment.8 ' The Flags court also believed after analyzing
the case law that an overly narrow definition of the
traditional banking practice exemption was not
appropriate. Instead, the court interpreted the exemption in
light of the legislative purpose of the anti-tying provision. 8'
The court found there needed to be an unusual banking
practice, a tying arrangement and a benefit to the bank.82
Next, the court explained that the definition of the
traditional banking practice exemption should be a broad
one.'83 In Flags, the borrower had to relinquish control over
his business. The court stated that although there may
have been tied products, "the imposition was directly
related to protecting the bank's investment."" Lastly, the
Flags' court determined that the reciprocal dealing
exemption would be over-inclusive if the exemption only
applies "where lenders commonly and traditionally require
borrowers to surrender the specific property interest at
issue in exchange for additional credit."'
The court directs one to focus on the general nature of
the arrangement instead of the property interest
transferred to determine if the arrangement fits within the
exemption.'86 The court concluded that this method of
analysis is more consistent with other components of the
traditional banking practice exemption which focus on the
nature and effect of the transaction rather than on whether
178. See id. at 935.
179. See id. at 936-37.
180. See id. at 939; see also Tose v. First Pa. Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 897 (3rd
Cir. 1981), Pappas v. NONB Natl Bank, 653 F. Supp. 699, 706 (M.D.N.C. 1987);
Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 696 A.2d 744, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997).
181. See Flags I, 831 F. Supp. at 934-35.
182. See id. at 937-39.
183. See id. at 937; see also Tose, 648 F.2d at 897.
184. Flags 1, 831 F. Supp at 936 (citing Tose, 648 F.2d at 897).
185. Id. at 937.
186. See id.
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a particular practice was traditional in the banking
industry.'
In analyzing the reach of the traditional banking
practice exception, the courts appear willing to permit
arrangements that protect the bank's investment in their
loan by improving the creditworthiness of the borrower.'
In other words, the courts appear to assume or consider the
purpose of a traditional banking practice as one intended to
protect the bank's investment in its loan. For example,
courts have found that a bank's attempts to control a
borrower's operations, actions, or personnel are traditional
banking practices if such requirements protect the bank's
investment in the loan by making the borrower more
creditworthy.'89 The courts have reached similar conclusions
with requirements requiring the borrower or related
entities to pledge collateral or guarantee the repayment of
the borrower's debt to the bank."'O
187. See id.
188. See Tose, 648 F.2d at 897; B.C. Recreational Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank,
639 F.2d 828, 832 (1st Cir. 1981).
189. See Graue Mill Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank & Trust Co., 927 F.2d 988,
990 (7th Cir. 1991) (requiring borrower to use bank employee as a construction
manager); Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 679 F.2d 242, 244 (11th Cir.
1982) (requiring a change of corporate management and majority stock
ownership); Tose, 648 F.2d at 897-98 (designating corporation's financial
advisor); B.C. Recreational Indus., 639 F.2d at 832 (requiring corporation to
hire a financial advisor); Marchelle Corp. v. Natl State Bank, No. 92-5111, 1993
WL 39661, at * 1 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 1993) (requiring borrower to follow certain
directives of the bank including selling equipment and firing employees);
Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 696 A.2d 744, 753-54 (N.J. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (requiring borrower to replace its accountants).
190. Sanders v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. in Great Bend, 936 F.2d 273,
278 (6th Cir. 1991) (requiring borrower to provide additional collateral in
exchange for forbearance on collection of defaulted loan); Bieber v. State Bank
of Terry, 928 F.2d 328, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring additional security for
the borrower-ranch to be put up by a second ranch (owned by the same people
as the borrower-ranch)); Palermo v. First Natl Bank & Trust Co., 894 F.2d 363,
367 (10th Cir. 1990) (requiring borrower to guarantee note of a related entity);
New England Co. v. Bank of Gwinnett County, 891 F. Supp. 1569, 1572 (N.D.
Ga. 1995) (requiring president of borrower corporation and his wife to
personally guarantee the extension of firther credit to the borrower
corporation); Alpine Elec. Co. v. Union Bank, 776 F. Supp. 486, 490 (W.D. Mo.
1991), affd, 979 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1992) (requiring the borrower to assume its
affiliate's loan); Blue Line Coal Co. v. Equibank, 683 F. Supp. 493, 495 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (requiring corporation's collateral pledged because of a default of a
personal loan of the individual borrowers); Cont'l Bank v. Barclay Riding Acad.,
459 A.2d 1163, 1170-71 (N.J. 1983) (requiring a mortgage on the property of
another corporation solely owned by a major shareholder in the borrower-
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In contrast, courts have found tying arrangements in
fact situations that required a borrower to purchase a
product or service that had nothing to do with the loan or
that did not improve the creditworthiness of the borrower
as a condition for a loan.' Similarly, courts also found a
tying arrangement with respect to requirements to sell
something to the bank that was not related to the loan or
did not further protect the banks's investment.'92 These
tying arrangements typically provided a benefit to the bank
outside of protecting the bank's investment. In contrast,
further protecting a bank's investment is not considered to
constitute a benefit to the bank that could result in liability
under the antitying provisions.'93
Tying an OTC derivative to the extension of credit
should constitute a traditional banking practice. The
principal purpose of requiring the use of an OTC derivative
is to hedge particular business risks incurred by the
borrower. By using OTC derivatives, the borrower is less
likely to be subject to unexpected fluctuations in interest
rates or prices, and should therefore be more creditworthy
and more likely to be able to repay the amount lent to them
by the bank.9 As expressed above, the OTC derivative is
required by the bank in order for the bank to protect its
investment in the borrower.
Although the use OTC derivatives post-date the
enactment of the antitying provisions, this should not
preclude it from qualifying as a traditional banking
practice. The Flags' court explained that too narrow a
corporation).
191. See Amerifirst Props., Inc. v. Fed. Corp., 880 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir.
1989) (requiring borrower to purchase certain ORE properties of the bank); JST
Props. v. First Nat'l Bank, 701 F. Supp. 1443, 1447 (D. Minn. 1988) (requiring
borrower to purchase property owned by the bank); Sharkey v. Sec. Bank &
Trust, Co., 651 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D. Minn. 1987) (requiring borrower to
purchase real estate from the bank).
192. See Costner v. Blount Natl Bank, 578 F.2d 1192, 1194 (6th Cir. 1978)
(requiring borrower to sell a substantial share of its retail commercial
automobile installment paper to the bank); Norte Car Corp. v. Firstbank Corp.,
25 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.P.R. 1998) (requiring borrower to give a right-of-first-
refusal to purchase retail property to the bank); Gage v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 717 F. Supp. 745, 755 (D. Kan. 1989) (requiring borrower to grant the
bank an option to purchase a portion of borrower's building).
193. See Graue Mill, 927 F.2d at 992 (holding that bank must not benefit
"beyond its attempt to protect its investment").
194. See supra notes 20-30.
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reading of the exception would be inappropriate: "[Tihey
would preclude many newly established banking practices
which serve legitimate banking interests without adversely
affecting competition."195  If the exemption were so
construed, it would have a negative impact on the lending
industry in particular because of the need to develop
creative ways for the lender to loan to the borrower while
still protecting its interest.'96
2. Unusual Banking Practice. The unusual banking
practice element appears to only be a requirement if the
tying relationship in question violates 12 U.S.C. § 1972
(1)(c). 9 7 As explained, it is possible, but probably unlikely,
that this provision would be applicable to a tie involving the
extension of credit and an OTC derivative.'98 It appears
from case law that a practice considered to be a traditional
banking practice cannot be an unusual practice.'99
In order to determine if a banking practice is unusual,
the courts have considered the opinions of experts in the
banking field and the testimony of people involved in such
transactions."' When the bank's requirement is intended to
protect its investment interest, the courts will view the
practice as usual.2"' As discussed above, given the frequent
195. Flags I, Inc. v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 831 F. Supp. 928, 937
(D.N.H. 1993).
196. See id
197. See Dibidale of La., Inc. v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 916 F.2d 300, 304 n.2
(5th Cir. 1990).
198. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
199. See New England Co. v. Bank of Gwinnett County, 891 F. Supp. 1569,
1575 (N.D. Ga. 1995); Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 696 A.2d 744, 753
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
200. See Gage v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 717 F. Supp. 745, 754 (D. Kan.
1989) (considering testimony that the bank had never before included an option
agreement such as involved in this loan); JST Props. v. First Natl Bank, 701 F.
Supp. 1443, 1450 (D. Minn. 1988) (considering expert testified that it was
unusual as a condition of a loan to require the customer to purchase property
out of the bank's real estate portfolio); Pappas v. NCNB Natl Bank, 653 F.
Supp. 699, 705 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (considering testimony of bank's loan officer
that the bank required some of its other customers to maintain minimum
balances).
201. See Tose v. First Pa. Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 897-98 (3rd Cir. 1981) (
designating corporation's financial advisor); New England Co., 891 F. Supp. at
1572 (requiring President of borrower corporation and his wife to personally
guarantee the extension of further credit to the borrower corporation); Alpine
Elec. Co. v. Union Bank, 776 F. Supp. 486, 490 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (requiring
ANTITYING RESTRICTIONS
occurrence of OTC derivatives being used to hedge business
risks, the practice should not be considered unusual.
20 2
CONCLUSION
Banks are aggressively requiring their borrowers to
enter into OTC derivatives to hedge their business risks.
Although this may potentially constitute a violation of the
antitying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act,
there are several reasons why such an argument would fail
to satisfy the elements of antitying claim. First, the
combination of a variable rate loan with an OTC derivative
such as an interest rate swap more closely resemble a fixed
rate loan than two separate products. Second, the tied
transactions would not be anticompetitive in nature
because it is likely that only the bank would be willing to
enter into the OTC derivative with the borrower. Finally,
combining a loan with an OTC derivative probably
constitutes a "traditional banking practice," and would
therefore be exempt from the reach of the antitying
provisions.
borrower to provide additional collateral); Pappas, 653 F. Supp. at 705
(requiring borrower to maintain available balance); Contl Bank v. Barclay
Riding Academy, Inc., 459 A.2d 1163, 1170 (N.J. 1983) (bank requiring a
mortgage on the property of another corporation solely owned by a major
shareholder of the borrower-corporation).
202. See infra Part IA.
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